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INTRODUCTION

One of the most ancient and fundamental precepts of
medicine is primum non nocere: First, do no harm.1 The
precept's longevity and its venerable role as one of the primary
principles of medical ethics2 reflect the fact that its few words
I Jonsen, Do No Harm:Axiom of Medical Ethics, in PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL
ETHICS: ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 27, 27 (1977); Nelson, Primum Utilis Esse:
The Primacy of Usefulness in Medicine, 51 YALE J. BIOLOGY AND MED. 655, 655-57
(1978). See E. PELLEGRINO, HUMANISM AND THE PHYSICIAN 100-01, 105-06 (1979).
The origin of the precept is obscure, but it clearly has its roots in the Hippocratic
corpus. Jonsen, supra at 27.
2 Nelson admits the importance of primum non nocere, but argues that it
should be replaced as the first principle of medical ethics by the maxim primum
utilis esse: Above all, be useful. Nelson, supra note 1, at 655, 666. See also
Lasagna, Discussion of "Do No Harm," in PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: ITS
NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 43, 46 (1977). Lasagna forcefully argues that "Itihe
proper medical and moral stance for today's physician, therefore, is not to avoid
harm at all costs, but to optimize treatment." Id. at 43.
Both Nelson and Lasagna seem to view the principle underlying primum non
nocere in a rather narrow way, which may account for their criticisms of the
precept. The precept can be understood to include much more than they find in it,

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/3

2

Zlotnick: First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and the
1981]

RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

contain a multiplicity of meanings.' Perhaps foremost among
those meanings is the recognition that all therapies carry with
however. See note 3 infra; see also notes 4-7 and accompanying text infra. Conceived of in an expansive way the precept is much more than a simple injunction
not to harm one's patients. Beyond that, it states a general principle of
therapeutic decisionmaking, a principle that counsels caution. before one
dispenses treatment and thereby upsets the balance that nature has reached.
Jonsen, supra note 1, at 40. Nelson would quite probably agree with the primacy
of primum non nocere when the doctrine is viewed in this way. He recognizes
that therapeutic measures have significant potential for harm, and he stresses the
point that treatment should be provided only when it is justified: "Competent
physicians should be able to articulate good reasons for holding that their interventions will be of tangible benefit to their patients. This should become an increasingly rigorous requirement as the mortality and morbidity of the intervention increases." Nelson, supra note 1, at 659; see also, id. at 659-62.
Physicians have always had to walk a tightrope in this respect. They have a
responsibility to intervene where they can do good, but an equally important
responsibility to abstain where their therapeutic powers are limited or where intervention will likely lead to more harm than good. See Reiser, Refusing Treatment for Mental Illness: Historicaland Ethical Dimensions, 137 AM. J. PSYCH.
329, 329 (1980). The crux of the problem is that many medical decisions are born
of substantial uncertainty. As one observer has noted, "[flor even the best-understood disease there are large gaps in understanding. Causes may be obscure and
For the doctor ... uncertainty is his constant
outcomes vary in probability ....
companion." Cassell, The Function of Medicine, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 16,

17 (No. 6, Dec. 1977). In addition see Cassell, Informed Consent in the Therapeutic
Relationship, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 767, 768-75 (1978); Boyce & Michael,

Nine Assumptions of Western Medicine, 1 MAN & MED. 311, 315-16 (1976);
Vladeck & Weiss, Commentary, 1 MAN & MED. 332, 332-34 (1976).
Physicians have reacted in various ways to the problem of uncertainty in
treatment decisionmaking. Some periods have been characterized by restraint;
others have been characterized by an interventionist ethic. See Reiser, supra at
329-30. The principle of primum non nocere counsels caution and restraint as opposed to undue activism. At its root, the precept is perhaps best viewed as an
"admonition to humility." Jonsen, supra note 1, at 40. It expresses an understanding of the physician's limits, and reminds him of the harm that can result from
well intentioned interventions beyond those limits. See E. PELLEGRINO, supra
note 1, at 105-06. There is considerable evidence that physicians increasingly appreciate their limits, as well as the negative consequences that may result from
ill-considered or overly intrusive therapeutic interventions. See Boyce & Michael,
supra at 319-22; Engel, The Need for a New Medical ModeL" A Challenge for
Biomedicine, 196 SCIENCE 129, 134 (1977); Reiser, supra at 331.
1 Jonsen defines four distinct usages of the precept: (1) the idea of medicine
as a moral enterprise; (2) the requirement that due care be used in one's practice;
(3) the need to balance the benefits of an action against its risks; and (4) the need
to balance the benefits against the detriments of an action. Jonsen, supra note 1,
at 28-38. He concludes by noting that the precept may serve "not so much as a
morality of lower limits, but as an admonition to humility." Id. at 40. Thus, the
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them both risks and detriments.' By reminding him of the negative factors that inevitably attend any therapeutic intervention, the precept cautions the physician not to treat as a matter of whim, but only when there are good reasons for doing so.
In addition, the precept warns that the particular therapy utilized
must be carefully considered and scientifically justified.'
Primum non nocere may thus be viewed as stating, in effect, a
presumption against treatment. On both the general and particular planes, and thus with respect to both the decision to
treat and the choice of a particular therapy, treatment must be
justified before it may ethically be administered.'
No comparable principle constrains the actions of those who
minister to the ills of the body politic.' Although the idea that
"the government governs best which governs the least"8 has
always had its followers, that notion has never dominated
American thought,9 and seems out of touch with the realities of
precept expresses more of an attitude than a practical rule; it conveys the
understanding that man has distinct limits and should not attempt to control matters that lie beyond the reach of his powers.
Id. at 33-38. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 659-62.
Jonsen, supra note 1, at 33-38. See E. PELLEGRINO, supra note 1, at 105-06;
Boyce & Michael, supra note 2, at 321-22.
' This is not to say that treatment must be justified in any formal sense,
either to the patient or anyone else. The point is simply that the decision to intervene, and the subsequent decision to employ a particular mode of therapy,
must be warranted. See sources cited in note 5 supra. Of course, a competent patient will normally decide for himself whether his physician's recommendation
regarding treatment accords with his own desires and values. Ultimately, the
decision is his either to undergo treatment or refuse it. See E. PELLEGRINO, supra
note 1, at 100-01; Nelson, supra note 1, at 663-66. See generally, Burt, Informed
Consent in Mental Health, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIoETHICs 762 (1978).

Cf. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 115 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled, North Dakota Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414
U.S. 156 (1973) ("The Constitution does not make it a condition of preventive
legislation that it should work a perfect cure. It is enough if the questioned act
has a manifest tendency to cure or at least to make the evil less").
People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N.Y. 1, 14, 59 N.E. 716, 720 (1901).
The Colercourt claimed that this idea was dominant at the time of the Con.
stitution's adoption and reasoned that the idea should, therefore, be used when interpreting that document:
It was once a political maxim that the government governs best which
governs the least. It is possible that we have now outgrown it, but it
was an idea that was always present to the minds of the men who framed
the constitution, and it is proper for courts to bear it in mind when expounding that instrument.
166 N.Y. at 14, 59 N.E. at 720. This claim is rather dubious. Certainly, there were

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/3

4

Zlotnick: First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and the
1981]

RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

twentieth century society. More importantly, the idea has never
been generally accepted as a constitutional norm."0 On the contrary, the courts, from the earliest days of the Republic, have
presumed the constitutional validity of legislation.1' This norm,
like primum non nocere, operates on both a general and a particular plane. There is a presumption in general that government may legislate, and no specific evil need be addressed by
the legislation. In other words, there is no need to justify the
fact of governmental action. 2 In its particular sense, the norm
people involved in the framing of the Constitution who felt that government
should be narrowly restricted. However, this view does not seem to have
dominated. See P. CARROLL & D. NOBLE, THE FREE AND THE UNFREE: A NEW
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 187-90 (1977); Meyers, Founding and Revolution:
A Commentary on Publius-Madison,in THE HOFSTADTER AEGIS 3, 4, 25-26 (1974).

If strong anti-government feelings had in fact been dominant among the Constitution's framers, it seems likely that the document would contain many more express limitations on the states than it does in fact contain.
A stronger argument can be made that the idea of narrowly restricting
government was dominant at the beginning of this century, around the time of
Coler, ,e., during the period known as the Lochner era. Decisions of the Lochner
era reflect the philosophy of laissez-faire, which was an important, if not dominant, element of the social thought of that period. See Bodenheimer, The Notion
of Positive Law, 26 AM. J. Comp. L. 17, 21 (supp. 1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-1 - 8-4 (1978). However, even that period did not witness a

general assault on the validity of public welfare legislation. Rather, the Lochner
era courts carved out a zone of economic "natural rights" that they protected
from governmental regulation. See L. TRIBE at § 8-4. Moreover, the very fact that
state legislatures passed social welfare legislation, such as that invalidated in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), indicates that even in the economic
realm the philosophy of laissez-faire was not without opposition. Indeed, the
Lochner court expressly noted, with more than a hint of pique, "[t]his interference on the part of the legislatures of the several states with the ordinary
trades and occupations of the people seems to be on the increase." Id. at 63.
,0 Even during the Lochner era the courts upheld most public welfare
legislation. They did, however, define a zone of economic rights, which they
decreed to be beyond the legitimate ambit of governmental regulation. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 9, at § 8-2.
"1 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810); Angel,
Substantive Due Process and the CriminalLaw, 9 Loy. CHI. L.J. 61, 63 (1977).
,1 Justice Black, writing for the Court in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963), expressed this idea in the clearest terms: "Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislators, not courts, to decide on
the wisdom and utility of legislation. . . . 'We are not concerned ...

with the

wisdom, need or appropriateness of the legislation.'" Id. at 729-30, quoting Olsen
v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941). In
addition, see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686 (1888; Van Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth
Amendment, 48 B.U.L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1968).
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teaches that government may act in any rational manner; there
is no need to justify the means used to achieve its ends. 13 Only
arbitrary or irrational governmental action is forbidden."
It is inevitable, however, that at times the exercise of governmental authority will intrude on individual rights and in-

terests that are especially important or delicate. In such situations some balance must be achieved; some means must be found
to appropriately reconcile the competing interests at stake. The
doctrine of the least restrictive alternative represents one ap13 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S.
483, 487-88 (1955). This idea has been firmly established since the early days of
the Republic. Writing for the Court, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat) 304 (1816), Justice Story noted that the powers granted by the Constitution are expressed in general terms, "leaving [it] to the legislature, from time to
time, to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and
model the exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests,
should require." Id. at 326-27. Of course, Justice Story was not traversing entirely
untraveled ground. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805).
Even during the Lochner era, although stringent means-ends analysis was
applied to legislation invading the realm of protected economic rights, see L.
TRIBE, supra note 9, at § 8-3, legislatures were generally allowed to use any rational means to achieve legitimate ends. As one commentator of that period
noted, a statute "is not necessarily unconstitutional because the means may seem
inexpedient or harsh." Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and the
Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 954 (1927). Indeed, even the Lochner Court
felt compelled to characterize the statute before it as "unreasonable and entirely
arbitrary" when viewed as a health regulation. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
62 (1905). The Court has never required more of police power regulations that do
not infringe upon protected rights than that their means rationally relate to a
legitimate state end.
There are signs, however, that somewhat more stringent means scrutiny is
being employed in an increasing number of equal protection cases. See, e.g., Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see generally L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at § 16-30;
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer EqualProtection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Nonetheless, the
norm under both due process and equal protection analysis, unless a fundamental
right or suspect classification is implicated, is that government may employ any
rational means to achieve a legitimate end. As the Court noted in Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977): "The holding in Lochner has been implicitly rejected many
times. State legislation which has some effect on individual liberty or privacy may
not be held unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole
or in part:' Id. at 597.
" E.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282-83 (1980).
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proach to such situations.15 This doctrine requires the government to pursue its ends by means narrowly tailored so as not to
encroach unnecessarily on important competing interests. The
classic exposition of this doctrine is found in Justice Stewart's
opinion for the Court in Shelton v. Tucker:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
pursued. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose.6
By focusing on means rather than ends, least restrictive alternative analysis can reconcile important conflicting interests
without sacrificing either one. 17 Hence, the doctrine is very appealing. In addition, when legislation infringes fundamental
liberties, it seems in accord with basic American values to require the government to employ the least restrictive means to
achieve its ends. As one commentator has noted, "[tihe notion
that government should not constrict the freedom of its citizens
to any greater degree than the community needs require may
Hoffman & Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally IlL- A
Doctrine in Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1100, 1101-03 (1977). The
doctrine frequently passes under other names: It is sometimes called the doctrine
of reasonable alternatives, at other times the doctrine of less drastic means or
less onerous alternatives. There are still other occasions when the doctrine is
used but remains anonymous. The federal bail statute, for example, implicitly
establishes a presumption in favor of the use of the least restrictive alternative,
but nowhere uses any such language. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976).
15364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnote omitted). In Shelton, the Court invalidated on first and fourteenth amendment grounds an Arkansas statute that
required all state-employed teachers to file annually an affidavit listing all
organizations to which they belonged or contributed. Id. at 480, 490.
"? See Angel, supra note 11, at 65; Hoffman & Foust, supra not 15, at 1101-03.
The classic argument in favor of means scrutiny is Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1949).
A number of contemporary commentators contend that means oriented scrutiny
does in fact have the advantages observed by Justice Jackson. See, e.g., Gunther,
supra note 13, at 20-24; Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). Others
argue that Justice Jackson's claim is essentially false; that means oriented
scrutiny is only meaningful when given substantive content. See L. TRIE, supra
note 9, at § 16-1.
15 See
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seem so elementary in a nation prizing individual freedom as
barely to require discussion."18
The least restrictive alternative principle was first articulated by the Supreme Court in the beginning years of the nineteenth century." By the final quarter of that century, the doctrine had firm roots in constitutional law, principally in the context of cases concerning state infringements on the federal
government's dormant commerce power. 0 During the course of
this century, the doctrine has been applied in numerous contexts. In recent years, it has been applied primarily when
governmental actions have infringed fundamental individual
liberties." Given the doctrine's capacity to reconcile conflicting
interests, it was inevitable that it would be applied to the
"massive curtailment of liberty"' represented by the civil commitment of mentally handicapped persons. Once incorporated into mental health law, it was equally inevitable that least restrictive alternative analysis would be applied to the troublesome
issues raised by judicial oversight of the treatment process. The
doctrine poses the possibility of reconciling the divergent views
of "civil libertarians concerned about unwarranted intrusions
upon individual liberties and clinicians concerned more with successful treatment than with temporary restrictions on personal
freedom."' The result is that in little more than a decade this
doctrine has become a cornerstone in the developing body of law
dealing with the rights of mentally handicapped persons.
Unfortunately, the rapid growth in the use of the least
restrictive alternative doctrine, in the context of mental health
law, has not been accompanied by a corresponding growth in understanding of the doctrine's contours. The courts have tended

" Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ilk Practical Guides and ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1138 (1972).
" See notes 29-68 infra, and accompanying text for a brief history of the doctrine's role in constitutional adjudication.
' See, e.g., Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1898); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 327-29 (1890); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465,
472 (1877); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1876).
" See Struve, The Less-Restrictive Alternative Principle and Economic
Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1463, 1464 (1967).
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
= Hoffman & Foust, supra note 15, at 1102-03.
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to recite the words "least restrictive alternative" as if incanting
a magical formula, often without considering the meaning of the
doctrine or the limitations on its use that are appropriate in this
context. Thus, many grave and difficult questions remain not
merely unanswered but, more seriously, unasked. The most
basic of these questions is whether society's interest in providing the most effective treatment possible should be sacrificed in
order to maximize the individual's liberty interest. If the answer
to this basic question is no, and the state's interests remain
paramount, then the least restrictive alternative principle would
seem to be virtually meaningless. On the other hand, if the
answer is yes, we may have effectively emasculated the state's
ability to provide meaningful treatment. Least restrictive
alternative analysis, of course, provides no easy answer to this
question; it is merely an analytical tool, a way of phrasing and
directing one's inquiry. At its best, it offers a means to analyze
the question, a means that holds out the hope of a principled
reconciliation of the conflicting interests at stake.
To date, neither the case law nor the commentators have
thoroughly considered the issue of the appropriate role of least
restrictive alternative analysis in the context of right to refuse
treatment cases. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to explore the applicability and meaning of the least restrictive alternative doctrine in the context of judicial oversight of the treatment given mentally ill persons. More specifically, its purpose is
to address the issue of whether (and to what extent) the doctrine
accords persons committed to state institutions a constitutional
right to refuse unwanted treatment. Towards this end, Section
II of the article, which follows this introduction, examines the
history of the least restrictive alternative principle, focusing on
its use in constitutional law.24 A few generalizations are advanced
regarding different uses of the doctrine, and the doctrine's role
in mental health law is discussed in light of those generalizations.' Section III focuses on the question whether committed
mental patients have a constitutional right to refuse intrusive
forms of psychiatric treatment. The interests of the individual
and the state implicated by this question are explored, and the
various approaches the courts have taken to this issue are reSee notes 29-68 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 69-118 infra and accompanying text.
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viewed.' Section IV discusses the applicability of least restrictive alternative analysis to the right to refuse treatment and considers the appropriate nature of a limited right to refuse. Three
particular problems in defining that right are then discussed.,
Finally, the conclusion explores the likely consequences that the
ideas discussed in the preceding sections will have on the treatment of the mentally ill, and justifies those ideas on common
sense grounds.2
II.

THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE DOCTRINE

The least restrictive alternative doctrine has played a major
role in constitutional adjudication during this century, a raie
that has assumed leading dimensions in the twenty years since
Shelton v. Tucker' was decided. It is beyond the scope of this
article to explore fully the doctrine's numerous appearances,
even within the limited field of constitutional law, 0 but some attention to its history is warranted. Through a study of the doc" See notes 125-195 infra and accompanying text.
r7 See notes 196-270 infra and accompanying text. The three basic questions
considered are the following: should treatment effectiveness be balanced against
the individual's liberty interest and sacrificed in order to maximize the latter interest? To what extent should judges defer to clinical judgments regarding treatment? May the principle of less restrictive alternatives be used to compel the
development of new, less restrictive forms of treatment?
" See notes 271-278 infra and accompanying text.
v 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
w It should be noted that the least restrictive alternative doctrine also plays
a role in a number of disparate statutory contexts. The doctrine has several uses
in administrative law; see Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity By Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380, 1426, 1433, 1440 (1973); Levinson, Enforcement Of
Administrative Decisions In The United States And In France, 23 EMoRY L.J.
321, 346 (1974); it also figures in various aspects of antitrust adjudication. See
Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 191, 231-33,
(1976); Struve, note 21 supra, at 1463 n.1. Furthermore, the doctrine is explicitly
incorporated into a number of statutes-for example, in the bill of rights section
of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6010 (1976). In addition, the doctrine is implicitly incorporated into other statutes.
The federal bail statute, for example, in effect imposes a presumption in favor of
the use of the least restrictive form of bail that is feasible. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976).
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979). Similarly, the principle underlying
the doctrine is embodied in the Model Penal Code's general provision regarding
sentencing, § 7.01 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962). See Morris, The Future Of Imprisonment- Toward A Punitive Philosophy, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 1161, 1162-63
(1974).
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trine's history one can arrive at a fuller appreciation of its
strengths and weaknesses, as well as a greater understanding of
its usefulness in analyzing the difficult question whether, and to
what extent, committed mental patients have a constitutional
right to refuse treatment.
A.

History of the Doctrine

The least restrictive alternative doctrine appeared in
American law at least as early as 1821, in a case concerning Congress' power to punish contempt. 1 After determining that Congress had such a power, the Court considered the extent of that
power and commented: "Analogy, and the nature of the case,
furnish the answer-'the least possible power adequate to the
end proposed;' which is the power of imprisonment."32 The least
restrictive alternative doctrine is still a vital part of the law
governing contempt," although its meaning in that context is far
from clear. 4 The doctrine seems to have two distinct roles in
contempt cases: in the context of civil contempt proceedings it
limits the sanction that may be imposed to the least drastic one
able to accomplish the court's sole legitimate goal of coercion;
in the context of criminal contempt cases it limits the use of
summary proceedings to situations where such summary action
is necessary-that is, where the less drastic alternative of
notice and a hearing is not adequate to accomplish the state's
ends.
31

Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204 (1821).
Id. at 230-31. The source of the quotation is not identified, nor is it known

to me.
" See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975); Harris v.
United States, 382 U.S. 162, 165 (1965); In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945).
' See Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New
Perspective, 88 YALE L.J. 39, 71 (1978); Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power
And The Constitution"The View From Without And Within, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv.
34, 84, 88 (1976).
1 Thus, the federal statute governing civil contempt orders for refusal to
testify before a grand jury or judicial proceeding specifies that the contemnor's
incarceration must end when the proceeding is concluded. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976).
The government's sole legitimate objective for incarcerating the person-to
coerce his testimony-becomes irrelevant at that point. Hence, futher incarceration is not only unnecessary when the proceeding is over; it is totally without a
rational relation to any legitimate state end.
" See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316-19 (1975); Kuhns, supra note
34, at 71-73.
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The budding of least restrictive alternative analysis occurred during the final quarter of the nineteenth century, in the
context of cases dealing with state intrusions upon the dormant
commerce power of the federal government." In an 1876 decision invalidating a state statute on dormant commerce grounds,
the Court noted that although the state's right to regulate
under its police power is normally quite broad, that right must
be narrowly restricted when it intrudes upon the federal commerce power. A state regulation that affects commerce, the
Court commented, "can only arise from a vital necessity for its
exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that necessity."' In its next term the Court reiterated this theme, noting
that a state "may not interfere with transportation into or
through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its
self-protection." 9
Least restrictive alternative analysis continues to play a
significant role in dormant commerce power adjudication," but
it is by no means invariably applied in those cases. 1 The key factor appears to be whether the state regulation has a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. 2 If there is such a
discriminatory effect, the normal presumption of legislative
validity shifts, and the state has the burden of demonstrating
both the efficacy of the statute and the absence of less restrictSee Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9
L. REV. 254, 257-60 (1964); Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, And Some Criteria,27
VAND. L. REV. 971, 993-95, 1017 (1974).
3 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
3

UTAH

Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1877). Later cases include Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 324-25 (1890); and Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania,
171 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1898).
40

See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353

(1977); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 375 n.9 (1964);

Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kan. Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 94, 94 n.12 (1963);
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520. 528 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
41 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
42

See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977);

S.C. Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938). Cf. Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1948) (Article IV privileges and immunities clause

will allow discrimination by a state against nonresidents only when such discrimination is necessary).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/3

12

Zlotnick: First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and the
1981]

RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

ive alternatives. 3 The commerce clause cases demonstrate the
usefulness of least restrictive alternative analysis when competing values are at stake. It is crucial that the states be able to
enact regulations to protect the health and safety of their
citizens. It is, however, also important that the states not be
allowed to restrict interstate commerce. The Court therefore
demands that the state show the necessity of the legislation-that is, the state must demonstrate that its legitimate interest could not have been adequately served by an alternatives
less restrictive of interstate commerce. Least restrictive alternative analysis thus is designed to honor the legitimate purposes of a statute while insisting that it be purged of its illegitimate elements."
Perhaps because there was no comparable distrust of the efficacy of the political process, least restrictive alternative analysis was initially held inapplicable in the context of due process
scrutiny of state economic regulations. It was not until the turn
of the century that least restrictive alternative analysis became
an element in the scrutiny of state economic regulations.45 As
the Court intensifed its scrutiny of these regulations during the
See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 804 (1976). But
cf. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129, 133-40 (1968) (where evidence of necessity is equivocal,

the Court may defer to the legislative judgment).
" The application of least restrictive alternative analysis may reflect judicial
distrust of legislative motives in such cases. Cf. Note, Less DrasticMeans and the
FirstAmendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 469-70, n.27 (1969) (noting that this may be
true in the context of first amendment cases). The court may feel that a state
legislature is attempting to achieve an illegitimate purpose-e.g., provide
domestic businesses with a competitive advantage over out-of-state concerns-under the guise of pursuing a legitimate state end. The fact that a less
restrictive alternative was available-ie., that the legitimate state object could

have been achieved without furthering the illegitimate purpose-both evidences
the legislature's illicit motives and gives the Court a justification for invalidating

the statute.
" See, e.g., Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905); Lawton v. Steele, 152

U.S. 133 (1894). The Lawton Court demanded that the state's means be
"reasonably necessary" for the accomplishment of its purposes. Id. at 137. The
concerns of the Lawton opinion, however, center on the procedural due process

issues raised by the statute, rather than on its validity as a substantive regulation of economic activity. Id. at 139-41. Despite these concerns, and the adoption
of the "reasonably necessary" test, the Court upheld the statute. Id. Note, supra
note 37, at 979.
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early years of this century, the doctrine became an increasingly
important element of such cases. However, in the late 1930's, the
Court in effect withdrew from meaningful due process scrutiny
of economic regulations. One part of that withdrawal was abandonment of the use of least restrictive alternative analysis in
such cases. Since that time, the Court has regularly reiterated
that a legislature may use any rational means to reach permissible economic ends, regardless of the availability of less restrictive alternatives." Thus, the least restrictive alternative doctrine
today has little role in economic due process analysis.
By contrast, the least restrictive alternative doctrine quickly took root in first amendment cases,'47 and it continues to flourish in that area of the law. 8 Despite the large number of cases
employing the doctrine, its role in first amendment adjudication
remains unclear.49 However, a few trends are apparent. The
Court tends to employ least restrictive alternative analysis to
invalidate a statute when it seems clear that any legitimate
state interests served by the statute could be equally well served
by an alternative less restrictive of first amendment rights." In
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963); Olsen v.
Nebraska ex rel. Western Ref. & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941). But cf.
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114-16 (1976) (employing less restrictive
alternative reasoning to invalidate a regulation that prohibited noncitizens from
obtaining civil service employment). The least restrictive alternative doctrine is
still used by a number of state courts in the context of economic due process
issues. See generally, Struve, supra note 21.
47 See, e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-49 (1943);
Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 705 (1931); Farrington
v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).
" See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343,
2350 (1980); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 100 S.
Ct. 826, 836 (1980); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977); United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967); NAACP v. Ala., 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406-09 (1963). For some interesting comments on
Robe, see Gunther, Reflections on Robe It's Not What the Court Did, But the
Way It Did It, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1140 (1968). With respect to the use of least
restrictive alternative analysis in first amendment adjudication, see generally
Wormuth & Mirkin, supra note 37, at 267-92; Note, supra note 37 at 1011-16;
Note, supra note 44; Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARv. L. Rav. 844, 911-18 (1970).
" See Note, supra note 44, at 464.
Id. at 469-70 n.27. Probably the best examples of the Court (rightly)
suspecting legislative motives are the NAACP cases. See NAACP v. Button, 371
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addition, if a statute discriminates against the content of expression or significantly impairs first amendment rights, the court
will generally invalidate it; often invoking the doctrine even
when there seem to be no equally effective alternatives.5 1
However, in other cases the Court either simply ignores least
restrictive alternative analysis, 52 or uses the doctrine as one element of a legitimate balancing process." Such cases seem to
have three essential prerequisites: the governmental purpose
must be both legitimate and important; the regulation must be
content neutral; and the intrusion on first amendment rights
must be relatively mild.- In these cases the existence of less
restrictive alternatives is one of the factors, but not necessarily
a determinative factor, in the Court's analysis of the statute's
validity. Unfortunately, the Court has not clearly defined the
role of least restrictive alternative analysis in the disposition of
such cases.
The frequent use of least restrictive alternative analysis in
recent first amendment cases is but part of a much broader
trend. During the past twenty years, the Court has employed
the doctrine in numerous contexts where governmental regulations "broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties."55 The fundamental liberties that have received the heightened protection
of least restrictive alternative scrutiny include the right of privU.S. 415 (1962); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Ala., 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
N See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 71 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting);
L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at § 12-30. It is this tendency that led one commentator to
observe that "the phrase 'less drastic means' does not so much explain the result
as announce it." Note, supra note 44, at 464. But see notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text, which disputes this generalization.
" See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980). Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion pointed to the existence of less restrictive alternatives that could
have adequately served the government's legitimate interests. Id. at 368. See also
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 n.40 (1979); id. at 574 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 467 (1977).
' See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at §§ 12-20, 12-30. Cf. id. at § 13-20, regarding
applications of the doctrine to ballot access cases.
0 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). The justification for applying
"more exacting judicial scrutiny" to such regulations derives from Justice Stone's
well-known footnote four. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938). See generally Karst, Forewar&Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, supra note 15, at 1016-28.
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acy,56 the right to travel, 57 the right to vote and participate in
electoral processes,58 the right to marry, 9 and the right to procreate. 0 Not surprisingly, the commentators have been even
more liberal with the doctrine than the Court, proposing that it
be used to scrutinize everything from child custody determinations"1 to the methods used to execute condemned prisoners.2
One ordinarily associates the increased protection of fundamental rights primarily with the strict scrutiny standard of
equal protection analysis. This points to the close relationship
between the least restrictive alternative doctrine and the equal
protection doctrine. By requiring that a classification be
necessary to the achievement of a (compelling) state interest,
the strict scrutiny test incorporates least restrictive alternative
reasoning." If a less restrictive alternative is available, then,
virtually by definition, the classification at issue must not be
" See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); id. at 497-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
17 See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 268-69 (1974);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451 (1973); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500, 507-14 (1964).
U See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. Number 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 96-97 (1965).
" See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
0 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Edue. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 642-48 (1974).
1 See Chemerinsky, Defining the "Best Interests". ConstitutionalProtections in Involuntary Adoptions, 18 J. FAM. L. 79, 107-09 (1979).
" See Gardner, Executions and Indignities-An Eighth Amendment
Assessment of Methods of Inflicting CapitalPunishment, 39 OHio ST. L.J. 96, 110
(1978).
1 Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 23, 29 n.27 (3d Cir. Nov. 28,
1980). See Note, supra note 37, at 997-1004. Of course, equal protection strict
scrutiny has a second element; the challenged classification must not only be
necessary, it also must be justified by a compelling state interest. See Gunther,
supra note 13, at 21; Harzenski & Weckesser, The Case for Strictly Scrutinizing
Gender-BasedSeparate but Equal ClassificationSchemes, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 439, 441
n.3 (1979). Because it does not demand a compelling state interest, least restrictive alternative analysis is therefore not as severe a standard of review as strict
scrutiny. See Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the
Burden of Proofand the Doctrine of the Least DrasticAlternative as Applied to
Sentencing, 58 CORN. L. REV. 51, 57-58 (1972); Spece, Justifying Invigorated
Scrutiny and the Least Restrictive Alternative as a Superior Form of Intermediate Review: Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment as a Case Study, 21
Aniz. L. REV. 1049, 1052-53 (1979).
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necessary for the state to achieve its ends. Similarly, traditional
equal protection analysis also incorporates least restrictive
alternative concepts. A challenge to a statute on the basis of
over-inclusiveness (or, for that matter, under-inclusiveness) is
essentially no different than an assertion that less (or, when appropriate, more) restrictive means exist for the state to accomplish its objectives. 4 At its core, the overinclusiveness argument simply contends that the state must more narrowly tailor
its means to fit its legitimate ends.65 The identical argument is
at the core of least restrictive alternative analysis.
In a similar sense, the least restrictive alternative doctrine
is on an interface with other principles of constitutional law. The
doctrine's prevalence in first amendment adjudication reflects
its close relationship to overbreadth analysis.66 Of greater
significance in the context of this article, least restrictive alternative analysis is an important element of conclusive presumption analysis. 7 In addition, the doctrine forms an integral part of
the "excessiveness" concept enunciated in recent death penalty
decisions." Thus, although the least restrictive alternative principle had but a brief existence in the context of economic due
process adjudication, the doctrine is unquestionably one of the
most important constitutional principles governing the relationship between the individual and the state.

See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at § 16-4 n.17; Note, supra note 37, at 1003.
See generally Tussman & tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
" See Note, supra note 37, at 464 n.3; Note, supra note 48, at 911-18. Thus,
most overbreadth cases can be looked at as least restrictive alternative cases.
See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.

380, 382-83 (1957).
67 See,

e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 648-49 (1974);

Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451-52 (1973); Note, supra note 37, at 985-89. The
least restrictive alternative doctrine has also been employed in other procedural

due process contexts. Id. at 989-93; see, e.g., Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,
240 (1960); U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1955); Palmigiano v.
Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1287-88 (1st Cir. 1973).

" See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia,

428 U.S. 153, 169-73 (1976) (plurality opinion). The significance of this will be

discussed in the following part of this section. See notes 78-91 infra and accompanying text.
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13. Different Aspects of the Doctrine's Analysis
In Butler v. Michigan the Court invalidated a statute that
forbad the sale to anyone of books or other matter that could
corrupt the morals of minors." Justice Frankfurter's majority
opinion contains what is perhaps the most colorful enunciation
of the least restrictive alternative doctrine: "The State insists
that, by thus quarantining the general reading public against
books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to
shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote
the general welfare. Surely, this is to burn the house to roast
the pig."7 Unfortunately, Justice Frankfurter's vivid words can
lead to a somewhat mistaken impression of the doctrine, a mistaken impression fostered in the first place by the very words
"least restrictive alternative." The doctrine is very rarely
employed to invalidate a statute because of its restrictiveness
(hereinafter referred to as intrusiveness); rather, least restrictive alternative analysis is almost always used, as it was in
Butler, to challenge the scope or breadth of governmental action
that would have been valid if more narrowly confined.71
This important distinction can be clarified by comparing two
of the opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut." In striking down
Connecticut's contraception statute, Justice Douglas's majority
opinion was clearly concerned with the intrusiveness of the
legislation; it emphasized that by forbidding the use of contraceptives, rather than their manufacture or sale, the state pursued its objective in the manner that would have the maximum
possible harmful impact upon the basic right of marital privacy.7" By contrast, Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion focused
352 U.S. 380 (1957).
70Id. at 383. Cf. Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Hernandez Colon, 415 F. Supp.
475 (D.P.R. 1976) (three judge court) (Per curiam). In invalidating a statute that
provided for the presence of government inspectors at political fund raising
rallies, the court commented: "A cannon has been used to kill a mockingbird." Id.
at 483.
7' At least two members of the Court have expressly recognized this distinction. Note, supra note 37, at 1032-33. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 78
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Spece, supra note 63, at 1054.
u 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 485. Although they are the exception, there are certainly other least
restrictive alternative decisions that focus on a statute's intrusiveness rather
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on the impermissible breadth of the statute; it noted that the
state's sole objective was to discourage extramarital sexual activity and found the statute to be unacceptably imprecise in that
it prohibited the use of contraceptives by married persons as
well as by the unmarried."'
Least restrictive alternative analysis is more common and
better established in the overbreadth context than it is in the
context of cases challenging statutes as overly intrusive. The
typical use of the doctrine in overbreadth cases is important
because it indicates that the Court stands on firmer ground
when it uses the doctrine in this way than when it uses the doctrine to invalidate legislation on the basis of intrusiveness. It is
relatively easy for the Court to observe that a statute sweeps
too widely, regulating the behavior of those who do not come
within its legitimate ambit as well as the behavior of those who
do. In pursuing this function, the Court acts in a time-honored
fashion that is consistent with its role in our form of government." On the other hand, when the Court invalidates legislation that directly pursues acceptable state ends, but does so in

than its breadth. Note, supra note 37, at 1032-33. See, e.g., Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S.
60 (1960); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
1' 381 U.S. at 497-98. Another example of this distinction is the use of the
doctrine in criminal contempt cases as opposed to civil contempts. In the criminal
contempt cases the doctrine's focus is on the breadth of applicability of summary
proceedings-ie., whether the particular case is one in which summary adjudication is necessary. In the civil contempt cases, though, the focus is on the severity
of the sanction-ie., whether the sanction is an unnecessarily harsh means for
the state to achieve its sole legitimate goal of coercion. See notes 33-36 supra and

accompanying text. Frequently, this distinction is difficult to delineate, and many
cases involve both types of inquiry. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 570-71
(1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, probably in most cases, both the breadth

of impact and the intrusiveness of a statute are important elements of the Court's
consideration of its validity. But one can attempt to distinguish those cases in

which intrusiveness is the dominant element by posing the following question:
Assuming that the state tailored its regulation with nearly exact precision to

cover only those for whom it was intended, would it nonetheless be impermissible? If the answer is yes, the dominant issue is the statute's intrusiveness. It
bears reiterating, though, that even when the dominant issue is overbreadth the
intrusiveness of the statute will certainly affect the degree of overbreadth the
Court will tolerate.
11See Note, supra note 37, at 1032-33. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980); Wellington, supra note 17. But cf. Christie, A Model of Judicial
Review of Legislation, 48 So. CAL. L. REV. 1306, 1336 (1975).
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too intrusive a manner, it acts in a much more questionable
way. 8 The line-drawing involved in such judgments has normally been deemed more appropriate for legislative than for judicial
determination. This is not to say that scrutiny of a statute's intrusiveness is never warranted; Griswold appears to be an example of where such scrutiny was appropriate, if unnecessary."
However, when a court uses the least restrictive alternative
doctrine to analyze a statute challenged as unnecessarily intrusive it should act with especial care and hesitancy.
Only the Court's perception of its limitations in this respect
can explain its failure to apply least restrictive alternative
analysis to death penalty statutes. On the surface, challenges to
these statutes present the most appropriate situations for application of the doctrine: The death penalty is society's most
severe intrusion upon the most fundamental individual right.
But, despite the urgings of two justices, 78 the Court has never
"' See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 418, 430, 451, 456 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Note, supra note 37, at 1032-33. Thus, in many cases where one would
have thought least restrictive alternative analysis appropriate the Court has
refused to apply it. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), which rejected
the principle as an inappropriate standard for scrutinizing the conditions of
pretrial detainment. Id. at 525. In addition, see United States v. Martinez, 428
U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12 (1976).
It is arguable that least restrictive alternative analysis of a statute's intrusiveness is only appropriate when the government seems to have two motives
for enacting the statute, one of which is illegitimate. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 532-40 (1979) (refusing to apply least restrictive alternative analysis where
government's purposes are legitimate). When legislation furthers legitimate state
interests, but also unnecessarily furthers illegitimate ends, the Court can effectively employ least restrictive alternative analysis to scrutinize it. This may,
however, be too limited a role for the doctrine. Some argue it should be used
whenever a statute seriously intrudes on fundamental individual rights, not merely to purge statutes that clearly further illegitimate interests. Id. at 567-70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But the Court has been reluctant to invalidate legislation
that directly pursues legitimate ends, even if it does so in an unnecessarily harsh
fashion or to an unnecessarily harsh degree.
" See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 239-41 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
A number of commentators have also argued that least restrictive alternative
analysis is appropriate for death penalty issues. See, e.g., Radin, The
Jurisprudence of Deat.- Evolving Standardsfor the Cruel and UnusualPunishment Clause, 126 PA. L. REv. 989, 1016, 1062 (1978). Indeed, it has been argued
that least restrictive alternative analysis is an appropriate form of scrutiny with
respect to sentencing issues generally. See id. at 1028; Morris, supra note 30, at
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really applied least restrictive alternative analysis to the death
penalty. 71 If it did do so, it seems clear that the Court would be
compelled to invalidate all death penalty statutes; no state could
bear the burden of proving that the death penalty was necessary for the attainment of its legitimate penological ends."
Although many decry the Court's death penalty decisions, the
opinions reveal a legitimate and arguably appropriate unwillingness to challenge legislative determinations regarding the
necessity of the sanction's severity.
On the other hand, the Court clearly has not been reluctant
to consider death penalty issues; nor, in the last decade, has it
been reluctant to invalidate death penalty statutes." However,
in considering these statutes, the Court has focused on issues it
feels competent to tackle -primarily, the breadth of applicability of the penalty 8 and the procedures used in imposing it.' In
analyzing these issues, the Court has frequently used the concept of excessiveness, which is quite closely related to the least
restrictive alternative doctrine. 4 The result has not been
wholesale invalidation of death penalty statutes, but can be
broadly characterized as imposing two kinds of limitations on
such statutes. On the substantive level, the Court has required
the states to justify imposition of the death penalty-for example, by statutorily defined factors-in an attempt to end the arbitrariness of its use.8" On the procedural level, the Court has
1162-63; Singer, supra note 63, at 55. The least restrictive alternative principle is

implicit in the Model Penal Code's general sentencing provision. See note 30
suvra.
79 See Godfrey v. Ga., 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980) (plurality opinion); Gregg v.
Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 174-76 (1976); Angel, supra note 11, at 132-33.
See Radin, supra note 78, at 1011, 1063-64.
81 See, e.g., Beck v. Ala., 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980); Godfrey v. Ga., 446 U.S. 420
(1980); Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Woodson v. N.C., 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
11Thus, the Court has invalidated mandatory death sentence statutes;
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 305, and it has invalidated statutes where
the penalty of death was disproportionate to the offense being punished. See
Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
0 Hence, the Court recently invalidated a statute that denied defendants in
capital cases the right to an instruction on lesser included offenses, even if the
evidence warranted such an instruction. See Beck v. Ala., 100 S. Ct. 2382, 2393
(1980).
" See, e.g., Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v.
Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion); Radin, supra note 78, at 1048-64.
" See Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238, 255-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
at 308-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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struck down mandatory death statutes and imposed a requirement of individual consideration, in an attempt to further limit
use of the penalty to appropriate circumstances." In short, the
Court has refused to second-guess legislative decisions to
employ this most drastic sanction; but it has continuously attempted to ensure that the sanction is used as responsibly as is
possible.
The death penalty cases illustrate the general fact that the
Court has been reluctant to rigidly apply the least restrictive
alternative doctrine in determining the acceptable degree of intrusiveness of governmental infringements of individual rights.
Moreover, on the rare occasions that it has used the doctrine in
considering the severity of state intrusions upon basic rights,
the Court's focus has invariably been on a statutory scheme.
The Court has never required the factfinder in an individualized
determination to decide that the sanction being imposed is necessary in that particular case." Such a requirement would seem
impossible to meet, given the very nature of the decisionmaking
process in the context of individualized adjudications. 8 For example, the Court could very easily decide that the death penalty
is unnecessary and, by applying least restrictive alternative
analysis, invalidate it. But the Court could not retain the death
penalty and, at the same time, require the trial judge to impose
it only when it was necessary. It would be meaningless and unrealistic to require the trial judge to justify as necessary the
penalty imposed in an individual case. In other words, it would
be impossible to justify, in any individual case, the necessity of
the significantly greater intrusion represented by the difference
between death and the lesser sanction of life imprisonment. The

" See Woodson v. N.C., 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (plurality opinion); Angel,
supra note 11, at 129. Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451-52 (1973) (invalidating
conclusive presumption of nonresidence in light of the availability of reasonable,
more individualized alternative procedures).
" See Singer, supra note 63, at 63-64. This should be contrasted with the
point made above that in certain situations an individualized determination is
necessary. The question then becomes what standard will be used in the individual hearing: Must the state limit itself to the least restrictive alternative in each
individual case? The Court seems never to have demanded this.
" See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316-17 (1975); Reisner,
PsychiatricHospitalizationand the Constitution: Some Observations on Emerging Trends, 1973 U. ILL. L. FOR. 9, 12.
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best a trial judge can do is to exercise his judgment and determine the penalty most appropriate under the circumstances."
This does not mean that the least restrictive alternative
principle has no role to play in sentencing decisions. Certainly, a
judge should always consider less restrictive alternatives to any
penalty and never impose an unnecessarily harsh sanction." The
doctrine's role in this context, though, is to express a normative
ideal; it does not express a rule of law that is subject to meaningful review. Ultimately, the sanction appropriate in an individual case is simply a matter of judgment. Of course, any
appellate court could easily find a sentence of ten years imprisonment to be excessive and unnecessary punishment for the
crime of littering. But that would be a judgment that such a
severe sentence is invariably unnecessary in light of the social
goals served by punishing people for littering. It would not be a
decision that the sentence was excessive because of the characteristics of the offender or the circumstances of his offense.
When one makes the latter sort of decision, when one chooses
between a fine of $10 and one of $100,91 one makes a judgment
I See id. Several courts dealing with mental health issues have indicated
that the principle requires individualized decisionmaking and a consideration of
less restrictive alternatives. But they have not rigidly demanded that the least
restrictive alternative always be used rather than other forms of care. See, e.g.,
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 113-16 (3d Cir. 1979)
(en banc), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 2984 (1980); Gary W. v. State of La., 437 F.
Supp. 1209, 1216-17 (E.D. La. 1976). As the court commented in Gary W.:
[t]he imperative that least drastic means be considered does not imply a
constitutional right on the part of every individual to a personal judicial
determination that the means being employed to improve his condition
are the best possible or the least restrictive conceivable. What is required is that the state give thoughtful consideration to the needs of the
individual, treating him constructively and in accordance with his own
situation, rather than automatically placing in institutions, perhaps far
from home and perhaps forever, all for whom families cannot care and
all who are rejected by family or society.

Id. at 1217.
'0 As noted earlier, the Model Penal Code adopts this point of view in its
general sentencing provision. See note 30 supra.
"' There is, of course, a better argument that least restrictive alternative
analysis can be meaningfully applied when sentences are qualitatively different,
not just different in degree. See generally Radin, supra note 78. Nonetheless, it is
generally "accepted that judges have the discretion to impose any sentence
authorized by statute. See Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
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based upon a complex set of particular factors. It is to be hoped
that such judgments are motivated by the spirit of the least
restrictive alternative principle, but the doctrine does not have
a useful analytical role in the context of these individualized
determinations.
The least restrictive alternative doctrine is simply an
analytical tool, a way of phrasing and directing one's inquiry.
Like all tools, it is very useful for some jobs but only a hindrance for others. The norm expressd by the doctrine is certainly relevant when a court considers the intrusiveness of governmental regulations. But the doctrine has proved to be of little
utility in analyzing the constitutional questions that merely involve distinctions in the degree of intrusiveness of regulations.
That is especially true in the context of individualized deterrninations.
There is, therefore, reason to question the usefulness of
least restrictive alternative analysis for scrutinizing the constitutionality of compelled psychiatric treatment, at least on the individual level. When considering individual treatment decisions,
one must start with the assumption that this kind of state infringement of liberty may be justified: that is, that in certain circumstances it is legitimate for the state to compel mentally ill
individuals to undergo psychiatric therapy.2 The obvious question to be asked is whether these are appropriate circumstances.
That inquiry will necessarily include consideration of whether
alternative, less intrusive, forms of treatment are available.
Given the uncertainties of psychiatric treatment, it is meaningless to impose least restrictive alternative scrutiny on this
type of decision. There will always be a less restrictive form of
treatment that conceivably could lead to equally good results. 3
11Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detainment warranted
when appropriate). Of course, it is not quite cricket to assume half the answer to
the question whether treatment may be compelled. Hence, I have attempted to
sketch out some arguments in support of the idea that the state should be able to
compel treatment in appropriate circumstances. See notes 149-163 infra and accompanying text. The point here, however, is the difficulty of making the individual determination that treatment is warranted in a given case. Obviously, if
it were decided that the state may never compel treatment, one would not reach
the issue whether it was warranted to do so in a particular case. Adopting an absolute right to refuse moots this difficult question.

0 See Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning and the Prisoner'sRight To
Refuse "Rehabilitation,"61 Via. L. REV. 155, 188-89 (1975).
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However, the efficacy of such alternative forms of treatment
may be quite doubtful. To demand that the least restrictive
alternative be used in such situations-that psychotherapy, for
example, always be tried before any more intrusive treatments
are used-would radically curtail the state's ability to provide
appropriate treatment.
However, least restrictive alternative analysis does have a
role in deciding such questions. The norm that it embodies-the
idea that government restrictions of liberty should be closely
scrutinized and kept to the minimum possible-must be part of
the treatment decision. Fortunately, this norm is an element of
any legitimate medical decision; it is one of the ideas at the core
of the precept primum non nocere: All treatments must be
justified; their risks and detriments must always be balanced
against their advantages." Too often, though, the implications of
this precept are forgotten, particularly by those practicing in
the demanding environment of the public mental institution.
However, the command of the least restrictive alternative doctrine is too basic to be ignored; its injunction to closely
scrutinize state intrusions upon fundamental liberties must be
made meaningful. The doctrine should not be rigidly applied in
this context. However, it demands that before the state compels
the use of instrusive forms of therapy less intrusive alternatives
must be considered; and intrusive treatments should be compelled
only when their use is clearly medically warranted. Further,
because the doctrine's basic commands are so frequently ignored, procedural safeguards must be developed to ensure that
those commands are adhered to in all decisions to use intrusive
forms of psychiatric therapy. 5
" See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text. As one observer has commented: "in either a private or institutional context, if there is a choice between
more or less equally effective therapies, the rational therapist should (and in the
case of an involuntarily confined patient, constitutionally must) choose the less intrusive." Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Contro" Autonomy and
the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 So. CAL. L. REV. 237, 287 (1974).
Notes on Equal Protectionand Due
"5See Perry, Constitutional"Fairness".
Process, 63 ViR. L. REV. 383, 420 (1977). Cf. Beck v. Ala., 100 S. Ct. 2382, 2389-91

(1980) (noting that the Court has frequently devised procedural solutions to death
penalty questions); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 583-84 (1979) (Stevens, J., dis-

senting) (due process demands individualized approach to determining the appropriate conditions for a pretrial detainee); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451-52
(1973) (conclusive presumption of nonresidency does not comport with due process, given the existence of reasonable, more individualized procedures).
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The Doctrine'sRole in Mental Health Law

The least restrictive alternative principle appears to have
been initially used in the context of mental health law in Lake v.
Cameron," a 1966 decision of the District of Columbia circuit.
The case was a habeas corpus action brought by Catherine Lake,
a somewhat senile but totally harmless elderly woman, challenging her commitment to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital." Chief Judge
Bazelon's opinion for the en banc court of appeals noted that
Lake's illness did not require the "complete deprivation of liberty that results from commitment.. ."" Based on the District of
Columbia commitment statute, the court held that trial courts
have a duty to explore alternative courses of treatment, less
restrictive than institutionalization.9 It noted further that
"[d]eprivations of liberty solely because of dangers to the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is necessary for
their protection.""'
Three years later, in Covington v. Harris,1 Chief Judge
Bazelon expanded the scope of the Lake decision in two significant ways. First, albeit in dictum, the opinion indicated that the
least restrictive alternative principle was constitutionally based:
the principle of the least restrictive alternative consistent with
the legitimate purposes of a commitment inheres in the very
nature of civil commitment, which entails an extraordinary
deprivation of liberty ....

A statute sanctioning such a drastic

curtailment of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even
grudgingly construed in order to avoid deprivations of liberty
without due process of law."'
N

364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc); See generally Chambers, supra

note 18; Hoffman & Faust, supra note 15; Spece, supra note 63.
364 F.2d at 658-59.
Id. at 660-61.
Id. at 659-60.
Id. at 660. Judge Wright, concurring, would have gone further. He found
Mrs. Lake's inability to care for herself to be an insufficient basis for involuntary
commitment: "This evidence makes out a need for custodial care of some sort, but
I cannot accept the proposition that this showing automatically entitles the
Government to compel Mrs. Lake to accept its help at the price of her freedom."
Id. at 662-63. Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("the mere
presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home
to the comforts of an institution").
101 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
' 2Id. at 623.
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Secondly, the court held that the principle applied not only to
the commitment decision, but also to the subsequent treatment
of the committed individual within the hospital:
The principle of the least restrictive alternative is equally applicable to alternate dispositions within a mental hospital. It
makes little sense to guard zealously against the possibility of
unwarranted deprivations prior to hospitalization, only to abandon the watch once the patient disappears behind hospital
doors. The range of possible dispositions of a mentally ill person
within a hospital, from maximum security to outpatient status,
is almost as wide as that of dispositions without. The commitment statute no more authorizes unneccesary restrictions within the former range than it does within the latter."°
Since Lake and Covington, numerous courts and commentators have applied least restrictive alternative analysis to mental health law issues. The doctrine has been used in four distinct
contexts: First, with respect to the issue of commitment, on
either the individual or group level. 04' Secondly, the doctrine has
been used to regulate the conditions of commitment'-e.g.,
"0Id. at 623-24.
104 See,

e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 569, 575 (1975); Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 103-08 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert.
granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980); J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 136-37, 139-40
(M.D.Ga. 1976) (three judge court),rev and remanded on anotherissue, 99 S. Ct.
2493 (1979); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132-33 (D. Haw. 1976);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D.Ala. 1974) (three judge court);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three judge court),
vac. on proc. grounds, 414 U.S. 473, reinstated on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376
(1974), vac. on proc. grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318
(1976). There is, however, authority to the contrary. In Sanchez v. N.M., 396 U.S.
276 (1970), the Supreme Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question an appeal that raised a least restrictive alternative challenge to the state's
commitment standards. See State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 441, 457 P.2d 370, 373
(1969). The dismissal in Sanchez was, of course, an adjudication on the merits. See
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1975). Nonetheless, the precedential
authority of Sanchez is subject to dispute, and the lower federal courts have
largely ignored or disregarded the decision. See Chambers, supra note 18, at
1152-53. The importance of Sanchez seems particularly questionable in light of the
Court's clear use of least restrictive alternative reasoning in O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 569, 575 (1975).
ICS See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 113
(3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert.granted, 100 S.Ct. 2984 (1980); Dixon v. Weinberger,
405 F. Supp. 974, 978-79 (D.D.C. 1975); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502 (D.
Minn. 1974), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Dixon v. At-
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whether a maximum security facility is necessary."' Thirdly, the
doctrine has been used to define the parameters of treatment
within the institution."7 Fourthly, the doctrine has been used to

support the concept of a right to treatment."8 Unfortunately,
with few exceptions, the many courts that have used the doctrine have not critically analyzed its meaning, or considered its
appropriate role in terms of the issues before them. Rather,
they have tended to merely recite the catch words "least restrictive alternative" en route to their decision.
It is beyond the scope of this article to meaningfully analyze
the role of least restrictive alternative analysis in each of the
above contexts." 9 Nonetheless, a few general thoughts based on
torney Gen. of Pa., 325 F. Supp. 966, 973-74 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (three judge court)
(consent decree); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1027-28 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
" See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 165-66, 305 N.E.2d 903, 905, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889,
892 (1973).
10 See, e.g., Evans v. Wash., 459 F. Supp. 483, 484, 488-90 (D.D.C.
1978) (consent decree); Gary W. v. State of La., 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219-20, 1228-31 (E.D. La.
1976); Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430, 437 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Davis v.
Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 373, 379-81, 384 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part,rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). In addition, several right to refuse
treatment cases have used least restrictive alternative analysis. See, e.g., Rennie
v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1146 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal pending (3d Cir. No.
79-2577); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911-13 (Minn. 1976).
"' This argument has been advanced by a commentator, but does not seem
to have been adopted by any courts. See Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment- A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional
Right To Treatment Theories, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 33-46 (1978); Spece, supra note
63.
'" The scholarship on the subject is already extensive. At least five articles
primarily concern the applicability of least restrictive alternative analysis to
various issues of mental health law. See Chambers, The Principle of the Least
Restrictive Alternative: The ConstitutionalIssues, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CITIZEN AND THE LAW 487-99 (1976); Chambers, supra note 18; Hoffman & Foust,
supra note 15; Spece, supra note 63; Spece, supra note 108. Numerous other articles dealing with mental health law discuss the doctrine to a lesser extent. See,
e.g., Barnett, Treatment Rights of Mentally Ill Nursing Home Residents, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 578, 590-602 (1978); Elkins, Legal Representationof the Mentally Ill,
82 W. VA. L. REV. 157, 221-26 (1979); Ferleger & Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization:
The Promise of the Pennhurst Case, 31 STAN. L. REV. 717, 737-39 (1979); German
& Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1050-53 (1976); Livermore, MaImquist, & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
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the preceding discussion are appropriate. To the extent a court
uses the doctrine to test the intrusiveness of a statute rather
than its breadth (and many of these cases will necessarily fall into the former category), it should be reluctant to overturn the
legislative determination. Further, in the context of an individualized decision, a court must be particularly wary regarding
its use of the doctrine. Perhaps because of an intuitive sense of
the doctrine's limitations in such a context, the District of Columbia circuit in Lake stopped short of a strict application. The
court did not mandate that all less restrictive alternatives be
tried and found wanting before resort to the more drastic alternative of commitment.11 Rather, it ordered the trial court to explore and consider the feasibility of alternative, less restrictive
courses of treatment."' This limited remedy, this mandate to
consider the alternatives with an eye to minimizing the restrictions on liberty, seems clearly warranted. However, more rigid
application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine may well
be inappropriate in such a context.
These same concerns were undoubtedly a factor in the Third
Circuit's recent en banc decisions in Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School and Hospital' and Romeo v. Youngberg."' Halderman was a class action in which plaintiffs challenged the very
existence of Pennsylvania's Pennhurst institution for the mentally retarded; they contended that community living arrange-

75, 89-96 (1968); Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally
Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 124, 150-58, 164-66 (1976); Morris, Institutionalizingthe Rights of Mental Patients: Committing the Legislature, 62 CAL. L. REV. 957, 960-67 (1974); Reisner,
supra note 88, at 10-13; Saphire, The Civilly-Committed Public Mental Patient
and the Right to Aftercare, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 232, 274-87 (1976); Tanay, Law
and the Mentally Ill, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 781, 800-03 (1976); Note, Developments in
the Law- Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1245-53
(1974).
"1 364 F.2d at 660-62. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551 n.32 (1979)
(eschewing strict use of the doctrine in determining the constitutionality of

pretrial confinement conditions).
'" 364 F.2d at 660-62. In addition, see Gary W. v. State of La., 437 F. Supp.
1209, 1216-17 (E.D. La. 1976).
"2 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980).
For a general discussion of the Pennhurst case's background and import, see
Ferleger & Boyd, supra note 109.
"I No. 78-1982 (3d Cir. November 24, 1980).
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ments were less restrictive environments than the institution
and that the residents of Pennhurst should therefore be cared
for in such community centers."' The court of appeals held that
mentally retarded persons have a right to habilitation in the
least restrictive environment,' but it reversed the district
court's order that Pennhurst must be closed. "6 The court of appeals refused to find that institutions are necessarily less effective than community living arrangements in facilitating the
right to habilitation in the least restrictive setting. Rather, the
court ordered that the needs of each patient be individually considered and that an appropriate habilitation plan be adopted for
each." 7 The court further held that, in devising an individual's

habilitation plan, there should be a presumption against institutionalization, "8 but it did not rule that out as a possibility. Thus,
the court shied away from a rigid application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine, adopting instead a twofold requirement: It mandated individualized decisionmaking and the concept of a presumption in favor of alternatives less restrictive
than institutionalization.
These issues surfaced again in Romeo, a civil rights action in
which the plaintiff sought damages for his inappropriate treatment at the hands of Pennhurst officials. "9 The Third Circuit
held that least restrictive alternative analysis was appropriate
for those claims alleging a direct restraint of plaintiff's liberty."'
In addition, the court held that where "the issue turns on which
of two or more major treatment approaches is to be adopted, a
'least intrusive' analysis may well be appropriate.""' However,
"' See generally Ferleger & Boyd, supra note 109.
.. 612 F.2d at 107.

I" Id. at 113-15. The district court's opinion is reported at 446 F. Supp. 1295
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
"1 612 F.2d at 114-15. See Gary W. v. State of La., 437 F. Supp. 1209,
1216-17, 1219 (E.D. La. 1976).
612 F.2d at 115-16.
"' That "treatment" included the shackling of Romeo to his bed for extended
periods of time. Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 5, 13 n.20 (3d Cir.
November 24, 1980).
Id. at 16.
,II Id. at 28. The court indicated that least restrictive alternative analysis
may well be appropriate in the context of challenges to such "fundamental liberty
violations" as the involuntary administration of "powerful antipsychotic drugs."
Id. at 26.
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the court also noted that the "application of a constitutional
standard of 'least intrusive alternative' on continuing treatment
programs . . . would prove unworkable."'" Further, the court
alluded to, but did not resolve, the critical problem that the
'least intrusive' alternative may well be the least effective mode
of treatment." These issues should be addressed in more detail
'
the right to
when the Third Circuit decides Rennie v. Klein,24
currently
pending.
case
that
is
treatment
refuse
III.

THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

Least restrictive alternative analysis has been used by a few
courts seeking to resolve the difficult question whether mentally ill persons committed to state institutions have a constitutional right to refuse intrusive psychiatric treatment.'" This section considers whether, and to what extent, there should be a
right to refuse treatment and discusses the various possible
bases for such a right. It is argued that a qualified right to
refuse treatment is both a constitutional mandate and a practical necessity, and it is suggested that the appropriate basis for
such a right is the Due Process Clause.
A.

The Competing Interests of the Individual and the State

Both the individual and the state have extremely significant,
and generally conflicting, interests at stake in the decision
whether to compel treatment. It is clear that an individual's
liberty interests are implicated when the state attempts to force
unwanted treatment on him. Given the fact that intrusive psychiatric therapies tread on rights long deemed fundamental, and
threaten serious and permanent deprivations of those rights,
this liberty interest is significant. However, the state's interests
are also significant. The state has a traditional parenspatriae interest in aiding the sick individual, and an equally important interest in protecting the health of society. Moreover, with
11 Id. at 28.
'2 Id. at 29, 29 n.47. This issue is discussed in the text accompanying notes
252-63 infra.
124Appeal Docketed, No. 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981).
' See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.Supp. 1131, 1146 (D.N.J. 1978). Appeal
docketed, No. 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905,
911-12 (Minn. 1976).
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respect to the individual committed to a public institution, the
state has an especially vital interest in providing effective treat-

ment, for only by providing treatment can a state justify the
fact of commitment. 26 Thus, the problem is not a simple one, and

it admits of no easy, universal answers. On the contrary, the
problem demands a subtle balancing of the competing interests
at stake, with close attention paid to the unique factors present
in each particular case.
1.

The Liberty Interest of the Individual

It is incontrovertible that state compelled psychiatric treatment implicates an individual's Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest."2 As Judge Higginbotham has forcefully observed, it is
difficult to believe that one's right to use contraceptives and
have an abortion are protected by the Due Process Clause, but
'" See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1975); notes 158-60 infra
and accompanying text.
" As the first circuit recently noted:
We begin our analysis with what seems to us to be an intuitively obvious proposition: a person has a constitutionally protected interest in
being left free by the state to decide for himself whether to submit to
the serious and potentially harmful medical treatment that is represented by the administration of antipsychotic drugs.
Rogers v. Okin, Nos. 79-1648/1649, slip op. at 2 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1980), petitionfor
cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1981) (No. 80-1417).
See also Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1263 (1980). The liberty interest has
long been recognized as a broad one. As Justice Harlan has observed:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not
a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property;
the freedom of speech, press and religion; the right to keep and bear
arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on.
It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,
... and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny
of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgement.
I Oral argument of Romeo v. Youngberg (3d Cir. April 28, 1980) (en banc).
Judge Higginbotham's remarks were subsequently confirmed by the third
circuit's opinion in Romeo. See No. 78-1982, slip op. at 26-27. Admittedly,
psychosurgery is the most blatantly intrusive form of treatment. But the differences between it and other modes of organic treatment are merely a matter of
degree. See notes 144-46 & 201-05 infra and accompanying text.
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1
not one's right to decline the state's offer of a free lobotomy. "
Indeed, in the course of holding that a state may not transfer a
prisoner to a mental institution without appropriate procedural
safeguards, the Supreme Court has recently recognized that the
possibility of compelled treatment implicates protected liberty
interests. 129 Further support for the idea that treatment, like
other conditions of confinement, implicates an individual's liberty interest can be found in the Court's recent decision that the
conditions in which pretrial detainees are held must comport

with due process.110 Additionally, a long line of cases has held
that individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in
refusing various forms of medical treatment. 131 There is no legitimate basis for denying the existance of an analogous interest in

refusing psychiatric treatment. To be sure, this interest is not
an absolute one, and may have to yield to overriding state interests.13 But, it is equally certain that the individual has a sig"2See

Davis v. Hubbard, No. 73-205 (N. D. Ohio Sept. 16, 1980); Vitek v.

Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1263 (1980); Addington v. Tex., 441 U.S. 418, 492 (1979). See
also Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp.
1342, 1365-68 (D. Mass. 1979) rev'd in part and remanded, Nos. 79-1648/1649 (1st
Cir. Nov. 25, 1980) petitionfor cert filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1981)
(No. 80-1417); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1147-48 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981); Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 876
(N.D. Ohio 1978) (three judge court); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022,
1027-28 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430, 433 (M.D. Tenn.
1974) (three judge court) (consent decree); Wyatt v. Stickney 344 F. Supp. 373,
379, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part and remanded in part sub nom Wyatt v.
Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Hoffman & Foust, supra
note 15, at 1106-08; Plotkin & Gill, Invisible Manacles: Drugging Mentally
RetardedPeople, 31 STAN. L. REV.637 (1979). Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
569, 574-76 (1975) (liberty interest at stake in commitment decision); McGinnis v.
Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 273 (1973) (rehabilitation of prisoners is inappropriate prior
to a finding of guilt).
11 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533-35 (1979); id. at 1895 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) (schoolchildren entitled to
due process protections); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (prisioners entitled to due process protections).
I See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383
A.2d 785 (1978). See generally, Baron, Assuring "Detached but PassionateInvestigation and Decision'" The Role of GuardiansAd Litem in Saikewicz-Type
Cases, 4 Am.J. L. & MED. 111 (1979); Anna, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz:
Decision Making for the Terminally Ill Incompetent, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 367
(1979).
13 Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (must reconcile
demands of due process with needs of institutions such as prisons). The state's in-
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nificant liberty interest at stake in the treatment decision.
A plausible argument can be made, however, that a decision
to commit, especially if the commitment is based on the person's
need for treatment, effectively vitiates the committed person's
liberty interest in refusing treatment.' Such an argument could
find support in the prison conditions cases, which, broadly
speaking, indicate that a valid conviction and sentence authorize
the state to treat the prisoner in any manner that does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment or contravene an independent constitutional right." Clearly, any punishment of civilly
committed persons would be constitutionally impermissible.'85
But one could argue that anything short of punishment, anytondition reasonably definable as "treatment," is acceptable simply
by virtue of the commitment order.13 For three reasons, however, this argument is invalid beyond narrowly defined limits.
First, the argument fails because treatment questions simply are not and cannot be decided in the context of a commitment
hearing. When an individual is committed, the judge frequently
decides to take that action because the individual is in need of
treatment. However, the judge never determines what kind of
treatment is warranted or, indeed, whether treatment (beyond
the fact of commitment) is warranted at all."'1 The former judgterest in compelling treatment are discussed in the text accompanying notes
150-62 infra.But cf. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1371 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd
in part remanded, Nos. 79-1648/1649 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1980) petition for cert
filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1981) (no. 80-1417) (finding an absolute right
of competent psychiatric patients to refuse treatment in nonemergency situations).
"=In essence, the argument is that a valid commitment necessarily authorizes not only custodial care but also compelled treatment. This argument is
developed at more length and with greater sophistication in the briefs of appellee
and amicus curiae, the American Psychiatric Association filed in Rennie v. Klein,
appeal docketed, No. 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981).
11 See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoner's Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
'1 Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); id. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the Constitution does not allow the punishment of pretrial detainees).
's Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-38 (1979).
" Inherently, these are two distinct decisions. See A. STONE, MENTAL
HEALTH AND THE LAW 47 (1975). The fact that an individual is in "need of treat-

ment" does not warrant the use of intrusive forms of therapy. More moderate
forms of treatment may be preferable. Or there simply may be no effective treat-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/3

34

Zlotnick: First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and the
1981]

RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

ment, that commitment is appropriate, is a matter within the
competency of a judge or jury to decide; the latter judgment,
whether treatment is appropriate and what form it should assume, is certainly beyond the province of the judicial factfinder.1 Unlike the type of issues that arise in the prison conditions cases,139 the decision as to what form of treatment is appropriate is neither reached at the commitment hearing nor is it
directly incidental to a decision that is reached. Thus, the commitment order should have no effect whatsoever on the individual's liberty interest regarding treatment decisions.
Neither the substantive norms nor the procedural regularity of
a commitment hearing can support the legitimacy of a decision
never reached in that context.
Secondly, the argument fails because of the very different
natures of criminal incarceration and civil commitment, and the
markedly different justifications underlying those actions. In
punishing a criminal offender, the state acts in furtherance of
four generally accepted goals-retribution, deterrence, restraint, and rehabilitation -the combination of which give the
state wide lattitude in handling the offender.140 These goals
become appropriate simply by virtue of the conviction-the
judgment that the defendant committed a criminal act-and, for
the most part, they remain valid throughout the term of the sentence. Hence, the proper sanction, the state's means of achieving
these goals, can be determined at the time of conviction.' On
ment available. Neither a responsible medical ethic nor a principled legal theory

could condone the use of intrusive therapies in such situations.
1- See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Choosing a mode of treatment
should, however, be distinguished from limited judicial review of that decision.
The review of medical decisions to ensure that substantive and procedural norms

were complied with is certainly within judicial competency. It is no different than
the types of decisions that judges make every day. Of course, even in that con-

text, some deference to the medical professional's judgment is warranted. See
notes 255-63 infra and accompanying text.
z See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
1

See LAFAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 5 (1972).

The fact that this initial decision may be revised-for example, by
parole-does not negate its legitimacy. Rather, this unfixed quality reflects the
fact that rehabilitation and restraint have a forward-looking dimension. To the extent the criminal sanction is solely justified by these goals, sentences should be
indeterminate. Because of the disturbing consequences of that point of view,
there seems to be renewed appreciation for the punitive purposes of the criminal
1

sanction. See generally Morris, supra note 109.
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the other hand, the purpose of a parens patriae commitment,
and certainly also the purpose of psychiatric treatment, is much
more limited: Treatment, like a parens patriae commitment, is
solely justified to the extent it helps the person being treated."
Moreover, this purpose does not remain fixed as do the justifications for the criminal sanction; rather, by their very nature,
treatment decisions must remain subject to change to reflect the
person's condition and need for treatment at any given point in
time.' For this reason, it is inappropriate that the commitment
order limit a person's liberty interests in treatment questions.
In addition, there is a third reason why the individual's
liberty interest in treatment decisions is not vitiated by a commitment order. The decision to compel treatment is a qualitatively different decision than that to commit, and, in its own
right, compelled treatment is a severe intrusion on fundamental
individual rights. It seems apparent, for example, that the state
may be quite warranted in committing many people, only a small
percentage of whom it would be warranted in compelling to
undergo psychosurgery. The two matters differ in their essence;
the former decision in no way includes the latter.1" Moreover,
compelling an individual to undergo psychosurgery clearly implicates fundamental and basic liberties: one's rights to physical
and mental health, to the integrity and autonomy of one's mind,
and to one's sense of self in the most direct sense can all be
significantly affected. " 5 Admittedly, psychosurgery is the most
obviously intrusive form of treatment, but the very same interests are implicated by more common forms of treatment-for
example, the long-term use of phenothiazines. Compelled medication poses significant risks of permanent and severe injury to
See Note, supra note 109, at 1207-22.
This distinction is analogous to that between criminal and civil contempt
sentences. See notes 34-36 supra, and accompanying text.
"' Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 14-15 (3d Cir. Nov. 24, 1980).
See A. STONE, supra note 137, at 47.
"' Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 26-27 (3d Cir. Nov. 24, 1980).
See Kaimowitz v. Mich. Dept. of Mental Health, No. 73-19434 (Cir. Ct. Wayne
Cty., Mich., July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
',
'

MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902-21 (1974). The interests at stake in such situations
are clearly on a different plane than the temporary "double-bunking" of pretrial
detainees or the other practices at issue in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Hence, some form of heightened judicial scrutiny of treatment decisions is warranted. See notes 195-211 infra and accompanying text.
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an individual's health and mental integrity. " ' Like psychosurgery, this form of treatment affects fundamental individual
interests not touched by the fact of commitment. The commitment decision does not in any meaningful sense authorize the
compelled use of such intrusive forms of psychiatric therapy.
This does not mean that the commitment decision authorizes
nothing beyond the bare fact of institutionalization. Certainly, a
valid commitment order removes a person's liberty interest in
those conditions that necessarily accompany institutionalization.
For example, if a patient is violent, the mere fact of commitment
authorizes temporary sedation or restraint." In addition, the
decision to commit probably warrants minimally intrusive types
of treatment that are generally applicable, such as psychiatric
consultations, group therapy, vocational rehabilitation, etc." 8
Following a valid commitment the individual's liberty interest
does not extend to these conditions of hospitalization. But no
more is automatically justified by the mere fact of commitment.
A commitment simply does not warrant intrusive psychiatric
treatment of any kind. The individual's liberty interest in refusing such treatment may not be absolute; but it is an interest
that survives the commitment decision and must be reckoned
with."'
14

See Davis v. Hubbard, No. 73-205 (N. D. Ohio Sept. 16, 1980); Rogers v.

0kin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1359-60, 1365-68 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd in part and
remanded, Nos. 79-1468/1469 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1980) petition for cert. filed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1981) (No. 80-1417); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp.
1294, 1298-1303 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981).
See generallyPlotkin, Limiting the TherapeuticOrgy: Mental Patients'Rightto
Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. L. REV. 461 (1977); Plotkin & Gill, supra note 129.
" See Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 12 (3d Cir. Nov. 24,
1980). Obviously, though, such authority must have limits. Institutional officials
should not be able to shackle a nonviolent person to his bed or chair for extended
periods of time and then justify that behavior as either a safety precaution or as
"treatment."
"I Commitment, without more, warrants only those forms of therapy that
are minimally intrusive and generally applicable to committed persons-i.e., what
might be called the lowest common denominator of inpatient treatment.
14 See Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip. op. at 10, 13-14 (3d Cir. Nov.
24, 1980) ("once inside the institution an individual's liberty interest is not summarily extinguished"). Typically, state commitment statutes will also create a
liberty interest in treatment questions. Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1261-62
(1980) (liberty interest created by statute regulating transfers from prison to
mental institutions). New Jersey, for example, provides by statute that commit-
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The State Interest in Compelling Treatment

No less certain than the individual's liberty interest in refusing unwanted treatment is the state's interest in providing and,
when necessary, compelling treatment. This state interest has
three somewhat distinct elements: First, the state has a traditional parens patriae interest in aiding the sick individual;
secondly, the state has a strong governmental interest in preserving and protecting the public health and welfare; and thirdly, the state has an especial interest in providing treatment to
committed mental patients, in order both to justify the fact of
commitment and to establish a positive therapeutic environment
within the institution. The significance of these interests
necessitates the conclusion that, notwithstanding the importance of the individual's liberty interest, there should not be an
absolute right to refuse treatment. Rather, any such right must
be qualified so as to allow the state to pursue its legitimate, indeed compelling, ends.
Little need be said concerning the state's parens patriae interest in providing mental health care. Although our society has
always placed considerable emphasis on both individual liberty
and self-reliance, it has long been accepted that government has
both the right and the duty to assist those incapable of fending
for themselves. This function of government seems particularly
critical today, given the shrinking role of family and community
in caring for the sick and helpless, and the increasing reliance on
societal solutions to these problems. The appropriateness of the
state's parens patriae function in providing mental health care
has been expressly approved by the Supreme Court in two recent cases."5 Although in its own right it may not be sufficiently
compelling to overcome the individual's liberty interests, the
state's parens patriae interest in providing psychiatric treatment is both legitimate and significant.
ted patients should be free from unnecessary or excessive medication. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4-24.2(d)(1) (West Supp. 1980). Once a state creates such a substantive
liberty interest it cannot limit the due process protections that the Constitution
accords to that interest. See 100 S. Ct. at 1262.
'

See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979); Addington v. Tex., 441 U.S.

418, 428 (1979); see also Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34 (1972); Prince v. Mass.,

321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944); Jehovah's Witnesses in State of Wash. v. King County
Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 503-05 (WD. Wash. 1967) (three judge court), affd, 390
U.S. 598 (1968). See generally Note, supra note 109, at 1207-22.
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The state also has a traditional interest in preserving and
protecting the public health and welfare.'51 This interest increases in importance to the extent that a disease has significant social costs. 5' Thus, in Robinson v. California,"' while
holding that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment to
make the status of narcotics addiction a crime, the Court expressly indicated that "a state might establish a program of
compulsory treatment for those addicted to narcotics."" 4 The
Court went on to analogize narcotics addiction to mental illness,
noting that "[a] state might determine that the general health
and welfare require that the victims of these and other human
afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving
quarantine, confinement or sequestration.""' It surely requires
no elaborate argument to establish that mental illness has
serious social costs. Thus, the same rationale that allows the
state to compel vaccinations against contagious diseases" warrants compelled treatment of serious mental illness. The social
costs of each are simply too great."
151See

Jacobsen v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
lu See id. at 25-26; Application of the Pres. & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (Wright, J., in camera), rehearingen banc denied,
331 F.2d 1010 (D. C. Cir. 1964), cert denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
13 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
" Id. at 665. Although the quoted passage is clearly dictum, the forcefulness
of its expression coupled with the idea's repetition later in the opinion, see id. at
666, indicates that the Robinson court had little doubt about the validity of the
civil commitment of addicts.
I
Id. See also id. at 668-69 (Douglas, J., concurring).
I
See Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Ill See Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 800 (1st Cir. 1973). This rationale for
civil commitment and treatment is not widely used, but perhaps should be. For
the truth is that while we most commonly justify mental health care with parens
patriae notions, that is not the reason we commit people or compel treatment. We
take these drastic steps most often because of the social costs and problems that
accompany serious mental illness; ordinary families and communities simply cannot cope with these problems and, at their breaking point, they come to society
for help. It is important to develop a rationale for society's role in mental health
matters that accords with this reality. For only by squarely facing this reality,
and abandoning the myth of parens patriae, can we meaningfully distinguish
legitimate government action from the kind of illegitimate and blatant abuses of
authority exemplified by O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Mere public
intolerance or animosity is not an acceptable basis for commitment. Id. at 575. But
when people's lives are endangered or seriously interfered with and society has
no other mechanisms to resolve the problem, commitment may be necessary. The
parens patriae rationale merely diverts attention from the realistic issues that
should be examined when we must decide whether to commit. In addition, the
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Probably the most significant state interest in compelling
treatment is the third one: Commitment warrants a state intrusion that would not otherwise be acceptable. It simply makes no
sense for society to commit an individual, thus restricting his
liberty in the broadest, most fundamental ways, and then not
utilize the beneficent powers at its disposal to treat that individual and hopefully end the necessity of commitment. Treatment
is what justifies commitment;' if we must commit, then we
have an obligation to treat.'5 9 To allow our institutions to become
mere warehouses for the confinement of the mentally ill is not
the sign of a rational society."' 0 Finally, commitment warrants
compelled treatment for another reason: It is essential for the
state to maintain a positive, therapeutic environment within the
parens patriaetheory goes too far; it has no intrinsic limits. We should be wary of
a gavernment that justifies the imposition of its will by saying that it is acting for
our own good, rather than admitting that it acts to meet social needs and
pressures. As Justice Brandeis has written:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
'"See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1974). Cf.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 (1975) ("a state cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom").
"' See Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1976); Note, supra note
109, at 1344. Cf. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 964 n.120 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) ("If we can tolerate the use of only these techniques that are unlikely to 'work,' in the sense of altering behavior or physicial
condition, how can we continue to justify involuntary hospitalization on the
grounds that it permits us to use those very techniques in the 'treatment' of mental illness?"). Admittedly, the argument advanced in the text can be criticzed as
being circular. We commit someone because he is in need of treatment and then
we justify compelled treatment by the fact of commitment. How can one justify
depriving a person of a protected liberty interest on the basis that he has already
been deprived of a more significant liberty interest? These criticisms have some
validity. But though they are logical, these arguments lose sight of the reality of
the situation. Ultimately, perhaps the best answer is to point out that many
things in the world are in fact somewhat circular. See generally MILTON, LYciAs.
11 See Perr, Presidents Message: The Most Beneficial Alternative: A
Counterpoint to the Least Restrictive Alternative, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. &
LAW IV (No. 4, 1978).
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institution.1 ' The committed person is not merely removed from
society; he is placed in a new society. That new society has its
own legitimate demands and needs which are peculiar to its unique
role.'62 Thus, the state has an interest in compelling treatment

both to justify the fact of commitment and to maintain a therapeutic environment within the institution. The significance of
these state interests requires that there be no absolute right tQ
refuse treatment; 6 . any right to refuse must be conceived in a
manner that will minimally interfere with these critical state interests.
B.

JudicialApproaches to the Right to Refuse Treatment

In their attempts to resolve the constitutional issues raised
by compelled psychiatric treatment, and appropriately reconcile
the competing interests at stake, the courts have taken four distinct tacks.'64 A number of courts have grounded the right to
I Dr. Stone has documented the institutional problems that can follow the
adoption of an absolute right to refuse treatment. See Stone, Recent Mental
Health Litigation:A CriticalPerspective, 134 AM J. PSYCH. 273, 278 (1977).
162 Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548-50 (1979) (constraints necessitated by
prison environment).
" But see Rodgers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1371 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd in
part and remanded, Nos. 79-1648/1649 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1980) petition for cert.
filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1981) (No. 80-1417).
11 See generally Appelbaum & Gutheil, "'Rotting With Their Rights On'"
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal By PsychiatricPatients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & LAW 306 (1979); DuBose, Of the Parens
Patriae Commitment Power and Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do the
Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1149
(1976); Gaughan & LaRue, The Right of a Mental Patient to Refuse Antipsychotic
Drugs in an Institution,4 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 43 (1978); Schwartz, In the Name of
Treatment Autonomy, Civil Commitment and Right to Refuse Treatment, 50
NOTRE DAME LAW. 808 (1975); Symonds, Mental Patients'Rightto Refuse Drugs:
Involuntary Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 701 (1980); Comment, Forced Drug Medication of Involuntarily Committed
MentalPatients,20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 100 (1975); Comment, Psychosurgery and the
Involuntarily Confined, 24 VILL. L. REV. 949 (1979); Comment, Madness and
Medicine: The Forcible Administrationof PsychotropicDrugs, 1980 Wis. L. REV.
497.
Other courts have based a right to refuse treatment on statutory grounds.
See, e.g., Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610,614 (D.R.I. 1978); Goedecke v.
State Dept. of Institutions, 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979); Plotkin, supra note 146,
at 497-502. Other courts have looked to common law principles as the basis of such
a right. See id. at 490 n.174. Neither of these approaches is dealt with in this article.
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refuse treatment on the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. Other courts have looked to the first
amendment as the basis of a constitutional right to refuse. In recent years, though, the focus has been on the right of privacy
and the due process clause as the sources of a committed patient's right to refuse psychiatric treatment. The following section briefly examines each of these four approaches.16
1. The Eighth Amendment Approach
It is clear that the state has a legitimate interest in treating
the mentally ill, but does not have a legitimate interest in
punishing people on account of their illness.6 Frequently,
however, the line between treatment and punishment is a rather
tenuous one. This has led a number of courts to ground a right
to refuse treatment on the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. In a pair of 1973 deci67
sions, Mackey v. Procunier'
and Knecht v. Gillman,' two
courts of appeals held that the use of harsh forms of aversive
therapy could constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Mackey
involved allegations of non-consensual administration of the
drug succinycholine, which can induce the sensations of paralysis and inability to breathe, leading to feelings of extreme
6 9 Knecht involved allegations of forced administration of
fright."

"I These four theories are briefly discussed in Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939,
946-47 (3d Cir. 1976), and are discussed in more detail in Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. 1131, 1143-48 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal docketed No. 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 5,

1981). See also B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 132-35

(1978); Plotkin, supra note 146, at 490-97.
"I See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731-39 (1972). Of course, an institution may legitimately punish sick persons who commit behavioral infractions, but
only if their illness does not negate the requisite mental element of the "offense."
See generally, Eule, The Presumption of Sanity: Bursting the Bubble, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 637 (1978).
'" 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
..488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733,
735-36 (9th Cir. 1974); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 356-57 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100,
103 n.7 (7th Cir. 1973); Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1972); Pena v.
New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Welsch v.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 503 (D. Minn. 1974), partiallyvacated on other grounds,
550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
"1 477 F.2d at 877-78.
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the drug apomorphine, following minor disciplinary infractions.1 0 The drug induces a prolonged period of vomiting as well
as temporary cardiovascular changes. These cases illustrate
situations in which eighth amendment analysis of compelled
treatment seems appropriate, 7' but they also illustrate the
limitations of this approach. Presumably, most right to refuse
treatment cases will not involve such harsh and clearly punitive
actions. When the state's objectives are legitimately therapeutic
rather than punitive, eighth amendment analysis is simply inappropriate."' Thus, although the eighth amendment approach
may be useful in the most egregious circumstances, it is of little
help in resolving the majority of cases, which present the more
difficult question whether committed mental patients have a
right to refuse legitimate therapeutic measures.
2.

The First Amendment Approach

It seems undeniable that the first amendment prohibits not
only state restrictions on the communication of ideas but also
"impermissible tinkering with mental processes."'7 3 This has led
several courts to conclude that mental patients have, at least in
certain circumstances, a first amendment right to refuse treatment. 17 Barring exceptional circumstances, 7 5 however, basing

10

488 F.2d at 1136-37.

But cf.Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), where the Court expressed
a general reluctance to extend the eighth amendment to settings not involving
criminal punishment, but left open the question "whether or under what circumstances persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile institutions can
claim the protection of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 669 n.37.
17 Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 7 (3d Cir. Nov. 24, 1980). See
Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal docketed, No.
79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981). Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 668-71 (1977)
(rejecting the applicability of eighth amendment analysis to school disciplinary
procedures).
"I Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf. Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the
thought of giving government the power to control men's minds").
17 See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Winters v. Miller, 446
F.2d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1972); Kaimowitz v.
Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne Cty., July 10,
1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 145, at 902. See also Rennie v. Klein,
462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143-44 (D.N.J. 1978), appealdocketed, No. 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan.
5, 1981); Plotkin, supra note 146, at 494-95.
"I The most obvious exceptional circumstance implicating the first amendment would be a religious objection to certain forms of treatment. This was the
''
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the right to refuse treatment on the first amendment seems as

inappropriate as basing it on the eighth amendment. Ultimately,
the conclusion that first amendment analysis is misplaced is
founded on the belief that legitimate psychiatric therapy of any
sort will enhance one's ability to think and communicate freely.
Treatment should not deprive John Rennie (the plaintiff in Renvie v. Klein) of the capacity to believe or express the idea that
he is the "'alpha omega' ... or Christ;"'76 rather, it should give
him the capacity that he now lacks to reject that idea as
unrealistic. In short, appropriate psychiatric treatment liberates
the mind, as well as one's potential for meaningful expression
and association; legitimate therapy is no more an abridgement
of these basic rights than it is a form of punishment.'
There is a second, less abstract, reason to eschew first
amendment analysis of compelled treatment issues. Even if one
assumes that a mental patient has a first amendment interest in
declining treatment, it is still necessary to confront the fact that
the state has strong reasons for requiring appropriate treatment.' These competing interests, though, seem incapable of
any accomodation or even meaningful analysis. How does one
begin to measure the individual's loss of first amendment rights
against the state's interests in compelling treatment? It is like
basis of the court's ruling in Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). In addition, any evidence that psychiatric treatment
was being abused, as it has been for example in the Soviet Union, in order to suppress political dissent or disfavored ideas would call first amendment analysis into play.
1 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1140 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-2577 (3d
Cir. Jan. 5, 1981). Cf. Bazelon, Institutionalization,Deinstitutionalizationand the
Adversary Process, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 897, 907 (1975) ("How real is the promise of
individual autonomy for a confused person set adrift in a hostile world?").
17 See Appelbaum & Gutheil, The Boston State Hospital Case: "Involuntary
Mind Control" the Constitution, and the "Right to Rot, " 137 Am.J. Psycii. 720,
721 (1980) ("Psychiatrists do not administer neuroleptics in an attempt to 'control'
minds but to restore them to the patient's control"). Many forms of treatment do
result in transitory side effects on thinking and one's ability to communicate.
These side effects, however, do not rise to the level of significant first amendment abridgements, see Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. at 1144, particularly when
one considers them in conjunction with the compelling state interests in providing
treatment. See notes 150-63 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Brown v. Glines,
444 U.S. 348, 359-60 (1980) (needs of the military warrant some incidental first
amendment restrictions).
'"See notes 150-63 supra and accompanying text.
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trying to balance asparagus against French pastry: True, one
eats both, but beyond that fact one searches in vain for a meaningful basis for comparison. The result of such a test can only be
ad hoc, outcome oriented decisionmaking. Thus, the first amendment approach, even it if is valid, is not likely to lead to meaningful analysis.
3.

The Right of Privacy Approach

In the last several years, the courts have tended to base the
right to refuse treatment on the emerging constitutional right of
privacy."' The courts have found in the right of privacy broad
protection for individual autonomy that includes freedom from
state authorized bodily intrusions. When it is used in this sense,
it is clear that the constitutional right of privacy is no different
than substantive due process. ' Whether one calls it "liberty" or
"bodily autonomy," it is equally clear that the individual has
very significant interests implicated when the state attempts to
use intrusive forms of psychiatric therapy on him.'81 The
significance of these interests has led at least two courts to conclude that competent mental patients have an absolute right to
refuse intrusive psychiatric treatment. 82 Other courts, more at"' See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1365-66 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd in
part and remanded,Nos. 79-164811649 (1st Cir. Nov. 25,1980)petitionfor cert.filed,
49 U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1981) (No. 80-1417); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp.
1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981); In re
K.K. B., 609 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1980); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910-911
(Minn. 1976). See also Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 n.9 (3d Cir. 1976); Runnels
v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1974); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp.
830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085,
1099-1100 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (three judge court); Plotkin, supra note 146, at 493-94.
The leading privacy cases deal with the questions of abortion; see, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); and contraception, See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally Fried, Privacy, 77
YALE L.J. 475 (1968). Notions of privacy also figure prominently in fourth amendment adjudication. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
I" See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-56 (1973); Packer, The Aims of the
CriminalLaw Revisited: A Pleafor a New Look at "Substantive Due Process",
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 492 (1971).

See notes 127-49 supra and accompanying text.
See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979) rev'd in part and
remanded, Nos. 79-1648/1649 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1981) (No. 80-1417); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla.
1980).
"'
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tuned to the significant state interests in compelling treatment,
81 3
have found that patients have a qualified right to refuse.
It makes little difference whether one uses the jargon of

privacy or that of substantive due process.18 ' However, it makes
a tremendous difference whether one adopts an absolute or a

qualified right to refuse treatment. Given the compelling state
interests in providing psychiatric treatment to committed patients,185 an absolute right to refuse treatment is inappropriate.
It thus becomes necessary to define the proper scope of a qualified right to refuse treatment. Because of the nature of the deci-

sion, the substantive standard that measures the state's right to
compel treatment must be medical in nature. The state should
be able to compel treatment whenever it can demonstrate that
the treatment proposed is clearly medically justified. Obviously,
any such judgment will have to take into account a large number
of factors: the seriousness of the person's condition, the likeli-

hood of deterioration (or improvement) without the treatment,
the efficacy of the treatment with respect to the person's condi-

tion, the detriments associated with the treatment, the likelihood and severity of possible side effects, and, not least impor-

tant, the availability of less restrictive alternatives. 88 All of

'a See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal docketed, No.
79-2557 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1976).
1' Substantive due process analysis is preferable for two reasons. First, due
process has an established history. That history provides courts with a body of
law to guide them in new situations. It also provides developed modes of analysis-e.g., least restrictive alternative scrutiny. In addition, that history provides
useful parameters for judicial scrutiny: it reminds judges that they have, at
times, outstepped the proper bounds of judicial review. For the same reason,
then, that many avoid due process analysis-the Lochner heritage-it may well
be the preferable approach. Secondly, due process scrutiny focuses the courts' attention on the issue at the heart of these cases-whether the state's interests in
compelling treatment warrant the deprivation of individual liberty that results.
Admittedly, the question is not an easy one, but it will not disappear, try as we
might to ignore it. Unless the courts adopt either an absolute right to refuse
treatment or an unfettered right to compel treatment, this question must be
asked in every case. Due process analysis brings the competing interests to the
fore and, hence, tends to lead to decisionmaking that is firmly rooted in reality.
See Comment, Madness and Medicine, supra note 173, at 506-07 n.46.
' See notes 150-63 supra and accompanying text.
See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1148, 1152 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 79-2557 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905,
911-12 (Minn. 1976). See also the elements of a "psychiatric emergency," discussed
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these factors are, of course, relevant whenever a physician
decides upon a proper course of therapy, whatever the con'
However, because this particular context-that of state
text. 87
compelled treatment- implicates significant fourteenth amendment liberty interests, the equation requires one additional factor. There should be a presumption against the compelled use of
M
In other words, before it may
any intrusive form of therapy."
compel the use of intrusive psychiatric treatment in nonemergency situations, the state should be required to
demonstrate that the treatment proposed is clearly medically
warranted. Demanding any more would hopelessly constrict the
state's ability to provide needed psychiatric care, given the uncertainties inherent in psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.89'
Demanding any less of a showing would short change the critical
individual interests at stake. Those very same uncertainties
counsel caution when we invoke the authority of the state to
compel the use of intrusive forms of treatment.
4.

The Due Process Approach

Those courts that have adopted a qualified right to refuse
treatment have recognized the need for procedural protections
to make that right meaningful.19 Such protections are clearly
in Rogers v. 0kin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1364 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd in part and
remanded, Nos. 79-164811649 (lst Cir. Nov. 25, 1980), petitionfor cert. filed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1981) (No. 80-1417).
'" See Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior ControL" Autonomy and
the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S.CAL. L. REv. 237, 287 (1974).
ISO The presumption against compelled treatment is also suggested by the
fact that psychiatric therapy is more likely to be successful when the patient
voluntarily accepts it and involves himself in a therapeutic alliance with his physicians. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 579 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
la See Addington v. Tex., 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).

"9See Davis v. Hubbard, No. 73-205 (N. Dist. Ohio Sept. 16, 1980); Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1147-48 (D.N.J. 1978); 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1307-11 (1979),
appeal docketed, No. 79-2557 (3d Cir.Jan. 5, 1981); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d
905, 911 (Minn. 1976). A number of other cases have also recognized the need for
procedural due process protections to safeguard the integrity of treatment decisions. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Gomes v. Gaughan, 471

F.2d 794, 800-01 (1st Cir. 1973); Davis v. Baison, 461 F. Supp. 842, 856 (N.D. Ohio
1978) (three judge court); Bell v. Wayne City Gen Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085,
1099-1100 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (three judge court); Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp.
338, 345 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
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warranted in the light of the critical individual interests at
stake and the significant risk of error inherent in all treatment
decisions: The decision is simply too important and too prone to
error to be left unreviewed. 19' Admittedly, the courts can not
hope to ensure the correctness of all treatment decisions; but
they can, indeed, they must ensure the legitimacy of any decision to compel the use of intrusive forms of treatment.
The appropriate nature of due process review is discussed
at some length in the following section. 1 2 At this point, it is fitting, however, to note the advantages of an approach that emphasizes procedural protections. Foremost among these advantages is the fact that procedural norms minimally encroach upon
the prerogatives of other branches of government. They do not
restrict the substantive choices available to the legislature and
executive, but merely safeguard the manner in which those
choices are implemented. 93 Of course, to impose procedural safeguards involves costs in terms of both time and money. Hence, it
is important to devise procedures that minimize those costs insofar as is possible. However, when the state encroaches upon
fundamental individual interests it must be prepared to accept
those costs that cannot be avoided.
191 The significant likelihood of erroneous treatment decisions is the result of
a number of factors: One factor is simply the considerable degree of uncertainty
that pervades psychiatric decisions in general; that uncertainty is exacerbated by
the awful conditions-understaffing, overcrowding, and lack of facilities-that
are the norm in our public mental institutions. Further, for several reasons, it is
likely that treatment decisions will err in the direction of excessive and unwarranted treatment, rather than in the direction of withholding necessary treatment. See notes 209-10 infra and accompanying text. This significant risk of erroneous treatment decisions is an important factor of the procedural due process
calculus and necessitates some form of procedural protections. See Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972). Procedural due process analysis must reflect the
reality of the setting under review. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967). The incontrovertible reality of our public mental institutions is that they are a mess.
See American Psychiatric Association-Position Statement, A Call to Action for
the Nation's Chronic Mental Patient, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 748, 749 (1979). Unjustified treatment is an everyday fact of life at these institutions, requiring the
imposition of meaningful procedural due process safeguards. See Rennie v. Klein,
462 F Supp. 1131, 1147-48 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-2557 (3d Cir. Jan.
5, 1981).
,n See Notes 224-39 infra and accompanying text.
19 Procedural due process scrutiny shares this advantage with other forms
of means-oriented review, including least restrictive alternative analysis.
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The procedural due process approach has other important
advantages. It stands on firmer constitutional ground than
either substantive due process or privacy, ' and, more importantly, it is an approach better suited to the capabilities of
courts. It is certainly inappropriate for courts to determine
either the substantive standards for psychiatric treatment or
the form of treatment that is suitable in any individual case. " 5
However, it is within the capacity of the courts to determine
that a decision was reached in a legitimate manner, or to examine a set of facts and decide whether an inference drawn from
them was warranted. These are time honored functions of the
courts, and ones that courts are uniquely qualified to handle.
Such procedural protections serve limited but important purposes. They can correct gross abuses of authority; they can illuminate the decisionmaking process and render it more accountable; and they can help to define and clarify the applicable
substantive standards. 96 To the extent the courts can achieve
these goals with respect to decisions to compel psychiatric treatment, they will have done much to protect the rights of committed mental patients without sacrificing the important state interests implicated in such decisions.
IV. THE ROLE OF LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
ANALYSIS IN RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT CASES
In the preceding section it was argued that recognizing an
absolute right of committed mentally ill persons to refuse treatment would be inappropriate in light of the significant state interests in compelling treatment. However, given the equally
critical individual interests implicated by treatment decisions, a
qualified right to refuse is essential. It was further argued that
the proper foundation for such a right is the due process clause,
barring unusual facts that implicate other provisions of the Constitution. Due process analysis has two major advantages over
other approaches: It aids the court in squarely confronting the
competing interests before it, and it enables the court to reconSee generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
See Parham v. J.L., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979). The proper degree of
deference to medical judgment is discussed in the text accompanying notes 254-62
infra.
'" See Hoffman & Foust, note 15 supra, at 1152-53.
19

195
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cile those interests in a manner that minimally sacrifices each.
The latter advantage.is especially true to the extent that the
court uses a means oriented form of due process scrutiny, or to
the extent a court relies on procedural due process protections
rather than imposing substantive limitations on state action.
This section further explores the dimensions of the right to
refuse treatment and considers the import of least restrictive
alternative analysis in defining the right. It begins with a justification for the use of least restrictive alternative analysis in
deciding right to refuse treatment issues. It then proposes
parameters for a qualified right to refuse, focusing first on the
appropriate substantive standard and then on the procedural
protections that are warranted. Finally, it examines three problems raised by least restrictive alternative analysis of treatment
issues: Should treatment effectiveness be sacrificed in order to
maximise the individual's liberty interest? To what extent
should the courts defer to medical opinions regarding the appropriate form of treatment? And may least restrictive alternative analysis be used to compel the creation of new less
restrictive alternatives?
A.

The Justificationfor Using Least Restrictive
Alternative Analysis in Deciding Right to Refuse
Treatment Issues.

In a straightforward, uncomplicated sense it seems appropriate to apply least restrictive alternative analysis to right to
refuse treatment issues. Traditionally, this mode of analysis has
been used whenever governmental actions threaten to "stifle
'
It cannot be disputed that the
fundamental personal liberties."197
compelled use of intrusive forms of therapy upon mentally ill
persons threatens protected fourteenth amendment liberty interests.198 However, liberty is an amorphous concept, and it
seems clear that not all deprivations of liberty merit the intensified level of scrutiny represented by least restrictive alternative analysis. 199 Moreover, the earlier discussion indicated that
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
* See notes 127-49 supra and accompanying text.
199 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523-24, 559 n.40 (1979); Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 126-29 (3d Cir. 1979) (Seitz, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. granted,100 S.Ct. 2984 (1980). See generally Spece, supra note
63.
19
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the applicability of this mode of analysis is questionable when
the intrusiveness of governmental action, rather than its
breadth, is in issue.100 Nonetheless, because of the nature and extent of the deprivation of liberty caused by the compelled use of
intrusive forms of therapy, least restrictive alternative analysis
is appropriate for handling right to refuse treatment issues.
Intrusive

forms

of

psychiatric treatment- including

psychosurgery, electroconvulsive therapy, aversive therapy,
and the use of psychotropic drugs"-tread on the most basic
liberty interests of the individual. Moreover, the intrusion on
these fundamental interests is radical in its degree."' By their
very nature, these techniques seek to effect significant changes
in the minds and emotions of the people subjected to them, and
they have serious side effects upon the physical and mental
health, as well as the ability to socially function, of the people on
whom they are used. By their very nature, such treatments pose
the risk of serious injury and even death.2" 3 Given the nature of
the individual interests at stake, and the extent to which those
interests are implicated, it seems self-evident that the use of intrusive forms of psychiatric therapy must be subjected to exact-

' See notes 69-91 supra and accompanying text. It would probably be more
accurate to say not that the doctrine is inapplicable in such a context, but that it
must be understood and employed in a more flexible manner than is usual. There
is little theoretical basis for arguing that the doctrine is inapplicable when the
issue is the intrusiveness of governmental regulation rather than its breadth. But
there are cogent practical arguments in support of the position that the doctrine
must be understood differently when the issue is that of intrusiveness-particularly in the context of an individualized determination. Id.
I" These seem to be generally accepted as the more intrusive forms of
psychiatric treatment.
m Both in due process and equal protection analysis, the Court appears to be
more consciously attuned to differences of degree in recent years. See, e.g.,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 (1978); id. at 391 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
1 The scholarly literature on the risks and side effects of intrusive forms of
therapy is quite extensive. See, e.g., Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied
BehaviorAnalysis in Mental Institutions and Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L. REv. 39 (1975);
Gobert, supra note 93; Plotkin, supra note 146; Plotkin & Gill, supra note 129;
Shapiro, supra note 94; Comment, Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the
Right to Refuse Treatment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354 (1975); Note, Conditioning and

Other Technologies Used to "Treat?"-"Rehabilitate?""'Demolish?"Prisoners
and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616 (1972). See also the sources cited in
note 164 supra.
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ing judicial scrutiny." 4 Least restrictive alternative analysis is
an integral part of such intensified scrutiny."5 Indeed, because

of its capacity to reconcile competing interests, the least restrictive alternative doctrine is ideally suited to resolving the

difficult problems raised by right to refuse treatment cases.
Other factors also counsel intensified judicial scrutiny of
right to refuse treatment questions."' For one matter, treat-

ment decisions are typically made by physicians and institutional staff. This is, of course, appropriate, but it is arguable
that decisions made by administrators of this sort are entitled to

less deference than decisions made by a popularly elected legislature, for example.117 A second factor is that compelled treat' See Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 26-27 (3d Cir. Nov. 24,
1980). Little effort has been devoted to supporting this point because it seems so
indisputable. In addition, previous commentators have extensively discussed the
risks and detriments associated with intrusive forms of therapy. See the sources
cited in note 203 supra. A more down-to-earth appreciation of the pervasive effects of the most common mode of therapy-medication-can be gleaned from a
few pages of the opinion in Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2557 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981). In an unemotional but moving
fashion, the opinion describes the effects of medication on a few typical residents
of Ancora State Hospital. Id. at 1300-03. More convincingly than scores of pages
of scientific studies or legal theory, this brief discussion demonstrates that compelled treatment can profoundly affect many of the most fundamental human
rights.
"s See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 115 (3d
Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980). The decision to invoke intensified due process scrutiny inevitably brings into play least restrictive alternative analysis. See Note, supra note 37, at 1036-39. The doctrine is an element of
that higher level of judicial review. Professor Spece argues, though, that the least
restrictive alternative doctrine represents an independent, intermediate standard
of judicial review. See Spece, supra note 63, at 1052-54. Certainly, it is true that
the least restrictive alternative principle is different than the compelling state interest test: The former looks at the state's means, the latter at its ends. See
Singer, supra note 63, at 57-58. However, the two tests are generally used in
tandem and are together referred to as strict scrutiny. In addition, the compelling
interest test is rarely used without the least restrictive alternative test. Thus,
while it may well be that the principle can stand on its own as an independent
level of review, least restrictive alternative analysis is an integral part of all
forms of intensified judicial review.
' For a discussion of the factors justifying intensified judicial review, see P.
BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 982-83 (1975); Spece, supra
note 63, at 1059-86.
See Del. River Basin Comm. v. Bucks County Water and Sewer Auth.,
No. 80-1662, slip op. at 10 n.11 (3d Cir. Feb. 18, 1981). See also Spece, supra note
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ment presents a paradigmatic example of an individual's claim
against governmental intrusion. Such claims have typically
received greater protection than claims for governmental
benefits. Our constitutional history reveals a consistent judicial
preference for placing limits on government over mandates of
affirmative government action."' A third factor suggesting the
need for intensified scrutiny is simply the awful conditions
typical of our public mental institutions. The misuse and overly
excessive use of intrusive forms of treatment is a fact of life in
these institutions.2 9 The overuse of treatment, in particular of
medication, is not so much a reflection of shoddy medical standards as it is an inherent product of institutional life; it is an inevitable response to the endemic problems of overcrowding and
understaffing."I Although this factor -the significant risk of improper use of intrusive therapies-is perhaps more relevant to
procedural due process concerns,2 11 it is not irrelevant with

respect to the appropriate substantive standard. When coupled
63, at 1078. For a discussion of the question of the appropriate degree of

deference to medical judgments, see notes 254-63 infra and accompanying text.
' This preference is well illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
had predicated its decision on the existence of a constitutional right to treatment.
493 F.2d 507, 520 (1974). The Supreme Court affirmed the holding that Donaldson
had been deprived of his constitutional rights, but inverted the approach. Rather
than basing the decision on a right to treatment, the Court based it on the right
to liberty, which one cannot be deprived of except for good cause. 422 U.S. at
572-76. The Court found that mere custodial care, such as that provided to
Donaldson, was insufficient to constitutionally justify the massive deprivation of
liberty represented by commitment.
See, e.g., Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 855-56 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (three
judge court); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 103-05 (E.D. Tex. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), reinstated, 430 U.S. 322 (1977);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd sub nom, Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). This is not merely true in Ohio, Texas,
and Alabama, but also in the presumably more enlightened states of Massachusetts and New Jersey. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1365 (D. Mass.
1979), rev'd in part and remanded, Nos. 79-1648/1649 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1981) (No. 80-1417); Rennie v.
Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1300-03. (D.N.J. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2557, (3d

Cir. Jan. 5, 1981). See generally J. ROBITSCHER,
210
O

THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY

(1980).

See notes 230-32 infra and accompanying text.
See Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 15 n.26 (3d Cir. Nov. 24,

1980). The proposals suggested in this article are essentially procedural in nature.
Even the substantive standard recommended, that of a presumption against the
use of intrusive forms of therapy, is quasi procedural in nature.
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with the fundamental interests at stake, and the significant extent to which those interests are implicated by treatment decisions, the fact that errors are common demands that the standards for compelled treatment be subject to stringent judicial
review. Least restrictive alternative analysis is a vital element
of this review. But the doctrine should not be blindly applied to
the difficult questions raised by treatment decisions-for example, to prohibit entirely the use of the more intrusive therapies.
Rather, we should seek to utilize the doctrine in a manner that
will maximize its potential to reconcile the competing interests
at stake without sacrificing either one.
B.

The Substantive Standardfor Compelled Treatment

Least restrictive alternative scrutiny mandates both
substantive and procedural constraints when the state seeks to
compel the use of intrusive forms of psychiatric therapy. Substantively, the principle demands that there be a presumption
against the use of all intrusive forms of therapy; and to the ex212
tent that there is a choice between different types of therapy,
there should be a presumption in favor of the less intrusive. In
other words, any intrusive treatment should be clearly warranted by contemporary medical standards before its use is compelled.1 On a procedural plane, the least restrictive alternative
principle requires that all treatment decisions be individualized;
moreover, the principle demands suitable procedural mechanisms to safeguard the integrity of the decisionmaking process.
At a minimum those safeguards must include the review by a
panel of independent psychiatrists of all decisions to compel
treatment. In addition, appellate review by the courts should be
available, but should be limited to the standard of the substantial evidence test. 1'
2 See Rogers v. Okin, Nos. 79-1648/1649, slip op. at 10 (lst Cir. Nov. 25,
1980). See also notes 252-63 infra and accompanying text, which considers

whether the efficacy of treatment should be sacrificed in order to minimize its intrusiveness.
"

Cf. Addington

v. Tex., 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) (Constitution requires

that standard of proof for civil commitment be that of clear and convincing
evidence). See Rogers v. Okin, Nos. 79-164811649, slip op. at 7 (1st Cir. Nov. 25,

1980).
.1.
This is the standard of review normally used by the courts in overseeing
administrative agency adjudications. The decisions of such agencies will be
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All treatment decisions require balancing the expected
benefits of the treatment against its costs and risks. On some oc21
casions the balance tilts dramatically to one side or the other;
on other occasions, either because of the serious consequences of
the therapy, its limited chance for success, or the relative efficacy of alternative modes of treatment, the therapeutic decision is a difficult one.216 Of course, normally, the decision is the
upheld unless they are not supported by substantial evidence. This is a highly
deferential standard of review, giving the benefit of all reasonable inferences to
the agency decision. See United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709,
715-16 (1963); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 29.01-29.03 (3d ed. 1972).
2ll For example, an individual with Stage One Hodgkins disease will generally
be treated with radiation therapy. The decision to undergo the therapy is usually
a clear one despite the fact that it involves significant costs and risks. Almost
everyone treated with the intensive amounts of radiation necessary to cure
Hodgkins will suffer numerous unpleasant side effects including nausea, fatigue,
loss of hair and soreness of the skin. Moreover, the therapy significantly increases the patient's chance of suffering other serious illnesses. Nonetheless, the
decision is usually clear because if left untreated Hodgkins will normally be fatal
within a fairly short time; if treated appropriately, chances of complete cure are
quite good. Thus, it clearly makes sense to accept the risks and detriments of the
therapy, serious as they are.
21 Therapeutic decisions may be difficult for various reasons. Perhaps, the
most common concern is the risk of the therapy. For example, surgery almost invariably entails significant risks. Thus, although it is often the most effective
form of therapy available, it may also be the most dangerous. This dilemma is illustrated by the situation of a patient who had colon cancer resected a few years
previously and who now shows indications that the colon has metastasized to the
liver. At least two modes of therapy are reasonable choices-chemotherapy or
surgical removal of a significant portion of the liver. The surgery yields
significantly better chances for prolonged survival; however, there is approximately a 15% mortality rate from such an operation. Thus, the risk factor makes
the choice of therapy difficult.
That choice can also be difficult because of the detriments associated with
the therapy. For example, assume a person with chronic ulcerative colitis, which
flares up periodically requiring hospitalization and causing serious disruption of
the person's life. The most effective treatment for this condition is an ileostomyi.e., a removal of the colon. The treatment cures the disease and involves relatively little risk, but it causes permanent inconvenience to the patient. Thus, this
decision can also be a difficult one.
It is crucial to recognize two characteristics of the above decisions. First,
they are necessarily individualized decisions; the age, physical condition, etc. of
an individual patient may well be determinative of these difficult choices. Secondly, it is important to recognize that these decisions are not purely medical
judgments. When all of the medical facts are known, there is still a difficult value
judgment that must be made. Normally, of course, this value judgement should be
left to the patient. See Comment, Madness and Medicine, supra note 164, at 521
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patient's, 17 guided by the advice and information provided by
his physician. In providing that advice-that is, in arriving at
his own decision as to the appropriate mode of therapy-the
physician is held to a standard of reasonable care. He is responsible for exercising reasonable medical judgment.
However, when the physician vests himself with the mantle
of state authority and seeks to compel treatment on unwilling
patients, the situation is very different. In at least certain of
these situations, the normal prerogative of the patient to make
the treatment decision must yield to the overriding state interest of providing appropriate treatment to committed mental
patients.21 However, more than a reasonable medical judgment
must support taking this drastic step. For treatment to be compelled it should be clearly warranted in light of all relevant factors. The patient's significant fourteenth amendment liberty interest requires such a presumption against the compelled use of
intrusive forms of treatment.2"9 The presumption should only be
overcome by a convincing showing that the proposed treatment
is justified.
The decision whether treatment is warranted is essentially
medical in nature. Hence, the factors relevant to that decision
are those that govern all therapeutic decisionmaking. They include the seriousness of the illness, the likelihood of improvement or deterioration without the treatment, the benefits of the
treatment, the costs of the treatment, and the risks associated
with the treatment." Not least important is the existence or
("The weighing of these risks against the patient's own subjective hopes and fears
is not an expert skill. It is a nonmedical judgment allocated to the patient alone").
2 See generally Burt, Informed Consent in Mental Health, 2 ENCY.
BIOETHICs 762; Cassell & Katz, Informed Consent in the Therapeutic Relations-

ship, 2 ENCY. BIOETHICS 767.
21 The state's interests are discussed at notes 150-63 supra and accompanying text.
"' See Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 28 n.45 (3d Cir. Nov. 24,
1980). Cf. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 115 (3d Cir.
1979) (en bane), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (Developmentally Disabled
Assistance Act creates presumption against the institutionalization of mentally
retarded persons).
See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1148 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 79-2557 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981). See also the factors relevant to the
presence of a psychiatric emergency, discussed in Rogers v. 0kin, 478 F. Supp.
1342, rev'd in part and remanded, Nos. 79-1648/1649 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1980) peti-
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absence of alternative, less intrusive modes of treatment. Any
rational therapist will always steer a course that aims at both
the most efficacious form of treatment and the least costly. This
is not to say, however, that the least intrusive mode of treatment imaginable will always or even generally prevail. Intrusiveness is but one factor in a complex equation. It is an important factor, though, and the rational therapist will naturally
lean towards those forms of therapy that have minimal negative

effects.221

Properly understood, the doctrine of least restrictive alternatives demands precisely this presumption against intrusive
forms of therapy. In the context of an individualized decision,
the doctrine cannot be applied strictly.' It does not entitle one
to that particular form of treatment that is least restrictive of
his liberty. Nor does it entitle one to have less restrictive alternatives tried and found wanting before resort to more restrictive approaches. It does, however, entitle committed mental patients to have less restrictive alternatives fully considered
before they are compelled to undergo intrusive forms of psychiatric treatment. Further, it entitles them to a presumption
against the compelled use of any intrusive form of therapy.'
tion for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1981) (No. 80-1417). Of course,
Rogers rejected the relevance of the notion of psychiatric emergency. Id.
The competency of the individual will certainly be of some significance, but it
should not be determinative. The theoretical basis for ignoring the question of
competency is that the justification for compelled treatment proposed in this article is not notions of parens patriae, but the needs of the state. Only when treatment is justified by parens patriae ideas are considerations of competency important. In addition, there are good practical reasons for avoiding the competency
issue. Determining the competency of a committed mental patient to make decisions regarding his treatment will inevitably be a time consuming and demanding
process. Moreover, it is complicated by the fact that the person's mental state
may vary considerably even over a short period of time. It seems unproductive to
allow this collateral issue to take the attention that should be given to the critical
issue-whether treatment should be compelled. Further, an argument can be
made that if an individual refuses treatment that is clearly warranted, that fact is
sufficient evidence of his incomptency to make the treatment decision. Thus, one
can justify ignoring the competency question if one compels treatment only when
it is clearly called for.
11 This is, of course, part of the teaching of the maxim primum non nocere.
See notes 1-6 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 87-95 supra and accompanying text.
See Rogers v. Okin, Nos. 79-1648/1649, slip op. at 9 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1980).
See also Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1146-48 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

57

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

The use of such therapies should be compelled only when clearly
warranted.
C.

The Requisite ProceduralSafeguards

The foregoing substantive standard-that of a presumption
against the compelled use of intrusive forms of therapy-is
meaningless unless accompanied by procedural mechanisms that
can adequately ensure the integrity of treatment decisions. In
recent years the Court has extended due process protections to
various aspects of the commitment decision."' However, despite
the fact that procedural due process holdings represent minimal
intrusions upon the states' prerogatives, the Court has not intervened into intra-institutional decisions. 5 A reluctance to
intervene into such decisions is understandable: They seem peculiarly within the province and judgment of the mental health
professionals who administer such institutions and peculiarly
outside the province of judicial scrutiny. Nonetheless, procedural due process safeguards are vitally necessary to ensure
the legitimacy of treatment decisions. The need for such safeguards is supported both by traditional procedural due process
analysis and least restrictive alternative analysis of right to
refuse treatment issues.
Whether procedural due process safeguards are required in
a given situation, and the kind of procedures deemed necessary,
docketed, No. 79-2557 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905,
910-11 (Minn. 1976). Cf. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d
84, 115 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (presumption against the institutionalization of
mentally retarded persons).
See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263-65 (1980); Addington v.
Tex., 441 U.S. 418, 429-33 (1979). But cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979)

(Georgia procedures for the commitment of minors with parental consent satisfy
due process requirements).
2 But cf. Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U.S. 1052, 1052 (1978) (due process protections required when prisoners are transferred to solitary confinement for
disciplinary reasons); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558-60 (1974) (due process
protections necessary when state revokes prisoners' good-time credits for
disciplinary reasons). Of course, the Court has shown considerable deference to
the needs and judgments of prison administrators. Id. at 555-56. But although
deference to legitimate institutional needs is appropriate, total withdrawal from
scrutiny of intra-institutional decisions would be intolerable. As the Court noted
in Wolff, "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country." Id. at 555-56.
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depend on three factors-the significance of the individual interests at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of those interests, and the costs to the state of providing the safeguards.26
The significance of the interests implicated by compelled treatment decisions has already been discussed.' Because intrusive
forms of therapy directly affect one's physical and mental wellbeing to a very significant degree, compelled treatment implicates interests of the first rank. Equally importantly, there is
a considerable risk of error inherent in all such decisions. One
reason for that large risk of error is simply the substantial
uncertainty that attends all forms of psychiatric diagnosis and
treatment.' While those uncertainties require deference to
legitimate psychiatric judgments, and reveal the inappropriateness of imposing too exacting a standard of proof,2 9 they also
counsel care in the decisionmaking process. Further, the significant risk of error inevitably associated with psychiatric judgments is exacerbated in the context of public mental institutions
by the overcrowding and understaffing that is a fact of life at
those institutions. For the simple reason that there is inadequate time to devote to each patient, these institutional conditions inevitably lead to erroneous treatment decisions. Moreover, it is critical to realize that the risk of error is heavily
skewed towards providing inappropriate or excessive treatment, rather than towards withholding appropriate treatment.
One reason for this bias in favor of treatment is the pressure on
the psychiatrist to keep his patients under control and not allow
them to disrupt institutional life." ° A second reason is the
psychiatrist's natural desire to help his patients. This laudable
desire unfortunately leads the physician to provide therapy in
situations where it is not warranted: It is his job to heal and it is
difficult to admit that because of the limitations of his science or
the scarce resources at his disposal he can do nothing. It is much
easier to make some attempt to help, even if that therapeutic intervention is not warranted."l Thus, not only do treatment decim See Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1263-65 (1980); Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S. 471, 481-85 (1972).
2

'

See notes 206-14 supra and accompanying text.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
Id.
See J.

ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1980).

See id.; Lerner, The Excessive Need to Treat: A Countertherapeutic
Force in PsychiatricHospital Treatment, 43 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 463, 465
2'
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sions inevitably involve a significant risk of error, but it is likely

that most of those errors will result in excessive or inappropriate treatment, not the withholding of appropriate therapy.
When one bears in mind the critical individual interests affected
by treatment decisions, it is clear that some form of review of
those decisions is warranted. 2
The procedural mechanisms adopted should be those that
will provide meaningful review at the smallest possible cost to
the state. Additionally, it is important to devise procedures that
will minimize delays and interferences with the treatment process.' Thus, although some form of adversary hearing is necessary, that hearing should be informal in nature. In addition, it
seems appropriate that the decisionmaker be a psychiatrist or,
preferably, a panel of psychiatrists. The most important requirement is that whoever makes the decision be truly independent
of the institutional mental health system.' The patient must
have adequate representation, preferably by an attorney,
although other competent persons could fill that need."s Any
(1979). Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("pyschiatrists tend to err on the side of medical caution and
therefore hospitalize patients for whom other dispositions would be more
beneficial").
Rogers v. Okin, Nos. 79-1648/1649, slip op. at 9, 18 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 1980).
See Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues of the President's Commission on
Mental Health, Mental Health and Human Rights, 20 ARiz. L. REV. 49, 109-11
(19,78); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1307-10 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal docketed,
No. 79-2557, (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 1981); Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 876-78 (N.D.
Ohio 1978) (three judge court).
Task Panel, supra note 232 at 109-11. See Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254,
1264-65 (1980).
m See Davis v. Hubbard, No. 73-205 (N. D. Ohio Sept. 16, 1980); Rennie v.
Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1308 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2557 (3d Cir.
Jan. 5, 1981). But cf. Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1264-65 (1980) (independent
decisionmaker "need not come from outside the prison or hospital
administration"). In Vitek, which involved the decision to transfer a prisoner to
an institution, the independent decisionmaker would not be in the position of
reviewing a decision to which he was a party. Nor was the decision being reviewed
an everyday type of decision that the reviewer himself had a vested interest in.
By contrast, treatment decisions must be made daily by all hospital physicians,
and they inevitably have an interest in the review of such decisions. Thus, it
would be inappropriate to allow a physician associated with the hospital to review
treatment decisions. He simply could not be truly independent.
Compare Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1265 (1980) (Opinion of White, J.,)
(attorney is necessary) with id. at 1266-67 (Powell, J., concurring) (attorney not
necessary).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/3

60

Zlotnick: First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and the

1981]

RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

decision should be in writing, supported by a brief statement of
the underlying reasons. The decision should reveal that less
restrictive alternatives were considered and the reason that
such alternatives were rejected. Finally; an appeal to the courts
should be available, but should be discretionary with the court
and limited by the standard of the substantial evidence test. 8
Obviously, such a system will have costs in terms of both time
and money, but when the state seeks to compel the use of intrusive forms of psychiatric therapy, regular review of the decision to do so is necessary to ensure that the treatment is appropriate and warranted."'
Least restrictive alternative analysis supports the establishment of procedural safeguards for the decision to compel treatment.m Its mandate that less restrictive modes of treatment
always be considered and be utilized whenever appropriate can
only be realized by establishing a structure to review the initial
treatment decision. Procedural protections of this sort serve
limited but important functions: They can correct gross errors;
they illuminate the decisionmaking process and render it accountable; they ensure procedural regularity; and they define
standards for the primary decisionmaker to use.29 Meaningful
2" The availability of judicial oversight is necessary in order to prevent
gross abuses of authority and aid in defining appropriate treatment standards.
Such review, however, should be limited in order to prevent essentially medical
judgments from being second-guessed by the judiciary. The limited review normally accorded administrative agency rulings, see note 214 supra, seems appropriate in this context.
How often such review is appropriate is a difficult question, and one that
probably will have to be answered on an individual basis. Obviously, challenges to
treatment decisions cannot be allowed on every occasion that a person is
medicated; equally obviously, approval of any course of treatment cannot be
meaningful after a certain point. Where that point lies will necessarily vary both
with the patient and with the type of treatment. Hence, it will have to be determined on an ad hoc basis. It is to be hoped that one result of according a limited
right to refuse treatment is that more attention and thought will be given to
treatment plans. The knowledge that such plans are subject to review should
have this effect.
"I See Bazelon, supra note 176, at 909. Cf. Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 113-16 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. granted,100 S.
Ct. 2984 (1980) (least restrictive alternative analysis compels individualized determination of whether institutionalization of retarded persons is necessary). In
other contexts least restrictive alternative reasoning has also been found to mandate procedural protections. See notes 67-68 & 81-86 supra and accompanying
text.
= See Hoffman & Foust, supra note 15, at 1152-53.
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review of treatment decisions will ensure that the presumption
against the compelled use of intrusive therapies is taken seriously in each individual case. The least restrictive alternative principle demands this; and surely our mentally ill citizens deserve
no less.
1).

Three Problem Areas

Many troubling questions arise when one attempts to apply
least restrictive alternative analysis to mental health treatment
issues. Three of the most basic questions are discussed in this
section: First, whether in the search for less restrictive alternatives, treatment effectiveness should be balanced against the
patient's liberty, and sacrificed to an extent in order to maximize the latter interest;" secondly, to what extent should
judges defer to medical judgments regarding the proper mode
of treatment?24 ' Thirdly, whether the least restrictive alternative doctrine may appropriately be used to compel the creation of new, less restrictive alternatives.2"2
1.

Should Treatment Effectiveness Be Part of the Balance?

The most fundamental question is this initial one: If two
treatment alternatives are available, one of which is both substantially more restrictive and substantially more effective than
the other, which one should be used? Expressed in more general
terms, the issue is whether treatment efficacy should be thrown
into the balance and sacrificed when doing so will significantly
increase competing interests.u If the more effective alternative
is invariably favored, there would seem to be little meaningful
protection for the individual's interests. However, to the extent
that more effective forms of treatment are sacrified, the state's
ability to provide treatment will be seriously eroded, posing the
See notes 243-53 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 256-65 infra and accompanying text.
', See notes 266-71 infra and accompanying text.
See Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 23, 29 n.47 (3d Cir. Nov.
24, 1980). Compare Hoffman & Foust, supra note 15, at 1107-08, 1142-44, 1163,
which although somewhat unclear on this issue, seems to favor throwing effectiveness into the balance, with Chambers, supra note 18, at 1184-88, which indicates that the state's interests, if they are significant, should not be sacrificed.
See also Perr, supra note 160.
"

21
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danger that state institutions will be transformed into little
more than warehouses for mentally handicapped persons.244 Although the question is a troubling one, the appropriate legal
standard should not sacrifice treatment effectiveness to increase competing liberty interests.245 This result is supported
both by the history of the least restrictive alternative doctrine
and by consideration of the way in which the doctrine is being
used in this context. Most importantly, this result makes sense
because an interest in maximizing the patient's liberty is an important element of any medical (and especially psychiatric) treatment decision. Because the balancing of effectiveness and restrictiveness is performed as an integral part of the primary
medical decision, it need not be an element of the governing
legal standard. Those reviewing the initial medical decision need
simply ascertain that the individual's liberty interest was in fact
accorded due weight in the decisionmaking process. Thus, effectiveness will in fact be balanced against intrusiveness, but only
with respect to whether treatment is medically appropriate. The
legal standard should incorporate that test, but should not require additional sacrifices of therapeutic effectiveness.
The history of the least restrictive alternative doctrine, as
well as the philosophy underlying the doctrine, support the idea
that effectiveness ought not be sacrificed-that is, that only
equally effective less restrictive alternatives need be used. As
noted earlier, one of the chief virtues historically advanced for
the principle is that it scrutinizes the state's means rather than
its ends.24 It thus makes little sense to use the doctrine in a
manner that requires the government to sacrifice its legitimate
ends. Traditionally, therefore, the doctrine did not require a
state to adopt alternatives that would be less effective in achieving its ends. Legislation was only invalidated when the state had
an equally effective but less restrictive means to reach its goal. The
Perr,supra note 243, at iv-vi.
Of course, a de minimus loss in treatment effectiveness should be
tolerated if to do so will allow the use of less intrusive forms of therapy.
Moreover, responsible medical decisionmaking may well require even substantial
losses in effectiveness if the risks or detriments of the more effective therapy are
too great. See notes 253-54 infra and accompanying text. See also notes 1-6 supra
and accompanying text.
I See note 17 supra and accompanying text. See also text following note 28
supra.
"
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balancing of competing interests was eschewed.24 However, this
rule was not always adhered to. In certain contexts, most notably in first amendment adjudication, "the Court has required
the use of a statute narrowly drawn to the dimensions of the
particular legislative goal, whether or not this is as satisfactory
as a broader law." 4 ' Thus, one could argue that, because fundamental personal liberties are directly affected by treatment
decisions, the relevant interests should be balanced.249
That argument can be faulted, however, for ignoring the
unique context of treatment decisions and blindly using ideas
applicable only in other circumstances. Earlier it was noted that
restrictiveness exists in two different dimensions-with respect
to the breadth of a statute and with respect to its intrusiveness.2O Effectiveness, similarly, may relate both to the inclusiveness of governmental regulation and to its ability to accomplish
its ends with respect to those properly caught within its ambit.
Good arguments can be made that some sacrifices in terms of inclusiveness should be accepted, particularly when the price for
not accepting them is overly broad limitations on basic rights.25
There is much less justification, though, for sacrificing the efficacy of regulations in achieving legitimate governmental ends
with respect to those properly within the ambit of the regulations. Because treatment questions fall into this latter category,
it seems inappropriate to sacrifice effectiveness, even though
important liberty interests are at stake. 2
The most important reason, though, is that the medical judgment as to the appropriate form of treatment necessarily takes
cognizance of the individual's liberty interest, albeit in medical
terms, and balances the intrusiveness of a therapy against its effectiveness. That is particularly true with respect to mental
" See Struve, supra note-2i, at 1468, 1468; Wormuth & Mirkin, supra note
31, at 287.
Id. See generally, Note, supra note 44; Note, supra note 109, at 1249-50.
Arguably, even in contexts other than that of first amendment adjudication least
restrictive alternative analysis has been used to balance competing interests,
with a resulting decrease in effectiveness of state regulation. Note, supra note 31,
at 1029-30, 1039-40.
' See Hoffman & Foust, supra note 15, at 1142-44.
See notes 69-74 supra and accompanying text.
21 See generally, Note, supra note 48; Note, supra note 44.
" See notes 75-95 supra and accompanying text.
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health treatment decisions. An appropriate therapeutic decision,
whether aimed at the normalization of a mentally ill personor
the habilitation of a retarded person, necessarily places strong
emphasis on maximizing the patient's liberty. 3 Striking the
balance between treatment effectiveness and restrictiveness is
a quintessential medical decision. That does not mean that the
decision is unreviewable, but simply that the decision can and
should be made by doctors in accord with established medical
standards. To superimpose a legal standard that once again balances treatment effectiveness and restrictiveness would be unnecessary and inappropriate. Judicial reviews of treatment decisions should be limited to ensuring that the patient's liberty
interest was accorded suitable weight in the initial decision-that is, that there was a presumption in favor of less
restrictive forms of therapy.' If, however, a more intrusive
form of therapy is likely to be significantly more effective, the
presumption may be overcome and the treatment should be
allowed. Only by refusing to sacrifice treatment effectiveness
can the judiciary avoid sacrificing the needs of patients on the
altar of individual rights."'
2.

The Appropriate Degree of Deference to Medical
Judgments

It is surely indisputable that judges are not the proper persons to make psychiatric treatment decisions. Nonetheless, it
would be equally inappropriate to totally exclude the judiciary
from the decision whether the state can compel the use of intrusive forms of psychiatric therapy. Judicial oversight of that decision is necessary, but it must be tempered by considerable
deference to legitimate medical judgments. The appropriate
standard for judicial review of treatment decisions is the substantial evidence test, widely used in administrative law. Judi'5 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 113-14 (3d

Cir. 1979) (en banc), cerL granted,100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980); Covington v. Harris, 419
F.2d 617, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1969); APA Position Statement, supra note 191 at 749;
Perr, supra note 160, at VII; Roos, The Law and Mentally Retarded People: An
Uncertain Future, 31 STAN. L. REV. 613, 622 (1979).
1 See Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 28 n.45 (3d Cir. Nov. 24,
1980).
1' See Stone, Response to the PresidentialAddress, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 1020,
1021, (1979).
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cial scrutiny under this standard will serve limited but important functions in helping to ensure the legitimacy and propriety
of compelled treatment.
Chief Justice Burger has recently pointed out the uselessness of excessive judicial involvement in psychiatric decisionmaking:
Although we acknowledge the fallability of medical and psychiatric diagnosis, we do not accept the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of
medical science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing
officer after a judicial-type hearing. Even after a hearing, the*
nonspecialist decisionmaker must make a medical-psychiatric
decision. Common human experience and scholarly opinions
suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for
the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness
may well be more illusory than real."
It is essential that the judiciary not intrude into areas of
decisionmaking that are in fact purely medical, and it seems inappropriate for judges to second-guess psychiatrists with
respect to the proper treatment for a given patient. Nonetheless, the judiciary does have a legitimate role in overseeing
the decision to compel treatment.
Several factors support a limited role for the judiciary in
mental health treatment decisionmaking. The underlying rationale for this role is that, although the physician's decision to
recommend treatment is a medical judgment, the patient's decision to undergo treatment is not a medical judgment. Rather, it
is a moral judgment, a value decision."" Normally, of course, this
decision is left to the patient, who is, in most cases, no more expert in medicine than the typical judge. Because of the critical
state interests in providing psychiatric treatment to committed
mental patients, this decision may, in appropriate situations, be
made by someone else-that is, treatment may be compelled." 8
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) (citations deleted).
" See Reiser, supra note 2, at 330-31. See also Burt, supra note 217; Cassell

& Katz, supra note 217; Cassell, The Function of Medicine, 7 HASTING

CENTER

REP. 16, 16-17 (No. 6 Dec. 1977).

The state's interests in compelling appropriate treatment are discussed in
the text accompanying notes 159-72 infra.
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However, there is no reason to entrust this value judgment entirely to a physician. On the contrary, when the state seeks to
compel the use of intrusive forms of therapy, it directly intrudes
on fourteenth amendment liberty interests of the individual," 9
and it is emphatically the province of the judiciary to safeguard
individual liberty against unwarranted encroachment by the
state. This value judgment can, indeed must, be made by the
judiciary.6 ' As one court recently observed, "whenever unalterable interferences with bodily integrity place deprivations of
liberty in issue, the law and not medicine is the ultimate
'
decision-maker.'
Some form of judicial scrutiny of psychiatric treatment decisions is thus necessitated by the courts' duty to protect individual liberties. It is also necessitated by the fact that psychiatrists
are no more immune from errors and institutional biases than
other mortals." 2 Their errors can take the form of gross abuses
of authority, occasionally amounting to cruel and unusual punishment that poses as "treatment." 6 ' More commonly, however,
their errors are neither so extreme nor so visible. Unfortunately,
though, they are quite common: Perhaps the best argument for
judicial scrutiny of therapeutic decisions is simply the awful conditions and standard of treatment that are typical of our public
mental institutions. Moreover, both institutional pressures to
control patients and well-intentioned desires to help inevitably
See notes 127-49 supra and accompanying text.
As Justice Stewart observed in his opinion for the Court in O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975);
O'Connor argues that, despite the jury's verdict, the Court must
assume that Donaldson was receiving treatment sufficient to justify his
confinement, because the adequacy of treatment is a "nonjusticiable"
question that must be left to the discretion of the psychiatric profession. That argument is unpersuasive. Where "treatment" is the sole
'11
"'

asserted ground for depriving a person of his liberty, it is plainly unac-

ceptable to suggest that courts are powerless to determine whether the
asserted ground is present.
Id. at 574, n.10. See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 629 (Fahy, J., concurring),
Spece, supra note 108, at 40-41, n.137.
21 Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 78-1982, slip op. at 27 (3d Cir. November 24,
1980) (en banc).
I See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatryand the Presumptionof Expertise:Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. RBv.693, 699-732 (1974).
1 See, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
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lead to a tendency to overtreatment.264 Thus, although deference
to legitimate medical judgments is appropriate, total withdrawal
from judicial scrutiny of treatment decisions is not warranted.
While necessary, judicial review of treatment decisions
should be of limited scope and should accord broad discretion to
physicians and hospital officials on matters of legitimate medical
judgment and hospital policy. The review of treatment decisions
should be handled like the judicial review of administrative
agency determinations. 85 Though limited, this standard of
review can serve very important functions: It can correct gross
abuses; it can illuminate the decisionmaking process and render
it more accountable; it can ensure procedural regularity; and it
can help to define standards for use in future situations. No
more can be done without encroaching on the breadth of choice
that must be available to those whose job it is to provide
psychiatric treatment; no less can be done without abdicating
the responsibility to safeguard basic constitutional rights.
3.

Whether Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis May Be
Used to Require the Creation of New, Less Restrictive
Alternatives

Perhaps the most intractable question is this one-whether
least restrictive alternative analysis can be used to demand the
development and use of new, less restrictive modes of treatment. Whatever theory one uses, the issue of new modes of
treatment is necessarily a question of what is practical and to
what degree. Least restrictive alternative analysis is no excepSee notes 230-31 supra and accompanying text.

See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Covington Chief
Judge Bazelon analogized the courts' role with respect to treatment issues to
their role in reviewing administrative agency determinations. He noted the purposes of limited judicial review:
The principle purpose of limited judicial review of administrative action
is to insure that the decision-makers have (1) reached a reasoned and
not unreasonable decision, (2) by employing the proper criteria, and (3)
without overlooking anything of substantial relevance. More than this
the courts do not pretend to do, and probably are not competent to do.
To do less would abandon the interests affected to the absolute power
of administrative officials.
Id. at 621. The standard for reviewing the findings of administrative agencies is
the deferential substantial evidence test. See note 214 supra.
25
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tion. Surely, a state would not be able to compel a person to
undergo psychosurgery when treatment with an accepted drug
would be equally effective, even if the drug was unavailable in
some sense. However, it seems equally obvious that a state
could not be required to provide years of intensive psychotherapy when it had at its disposal a drug generally used for the patient's malady. In general though, least restrictive alternative
analysis is ill-suited as a basis for imposing affirmative obligations on government to create new forms of treatment.
There is some support on both sides of this issue. Several
commentators have suggested that the doctrine can be used to
require new treatment alternatives. 66 Indeed, one has gone so
far as to argue that least restrictive alternative analysis is the
proper foundation for the right to treatment."7 No court has
gone that far, but several lean in that direction.268 Other courts,
however, have indicated that least restrictive alternative
analysis neither requires the creation of new treatment alternatives nor the expenditure of additional funds.6 9
The idea of creating new, less restrictive modes of mental
health care is certainly appealing, but the courts should be hesitant to find such a mandate in the least restrictive alternative
principle. It is simply not suited to act as the catalyst for this
kind of social change. Historically, the doctrine has been used to
check the state's ability to encroach unnecessarily on the fundamental liberties of its citizens. The doctrine says to the state:
"Intrude on liberty if you must, but do so in the least harmful
manner." Its beauty lies in the fact that it minimally interferes
with the functions and prerogatives of the executive and legislative branches of government. That beauty is lost when the
doctrine is bent to serve as a vehicle for judicially mandated af" See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 18, at 1189-98; Note, supra note 109, at
1250-53.
See Spece, supra note 108.
"t See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84,
101-03 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 2984 (1980); J.R. v. Parham,
412 F. Supp. 112, 139-40 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three judge court), reversed on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
1 Romeo v. Youngberg, No. 79-1982, slip op. at 32 (3d Cir. Nov. 24, 1980).
See also, Gary W. v. State of La., 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1217-19, (E.D. La. 1976);
Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See generally Frug,
The JudicialPower of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. Ruv. 715 (1978).
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firmative reforms."' It is, thus, the appropriate theory with
which to enforce a qualified right to refuse treatment. It is not,
however, an appropriate basis for imposing a right to treatment.Y1 And to the extent that the courts possess the authority
to require the allocation of societal resources to new modes of
mental health care, that authority would seem to derive more
logically from the right to treatment than from the doctrine of
the least restrictive alternative.
V.

CONCLUSION

The least restrictive alternative doctrine is useful in analyzing the difficult questions of whether and to what extent committed mental patients have a constitutional right to refuse
treatment. However, the doctrine should not be viewed as a
hard and fast rule of law directly derived from well-established
principles of substantive due process. Rather it should be viewed
as the expression of a basic societal norm loosely rooted in our
notions of the proper relationship between government and the
individual. That norm teaches that the treatment and care of
mentally handicapped persons should be done in the manner
least restrictive of the freedom of those persons. A corollary of
this basic norm is the principle that treatments that effect a
significant deprivation of individual liberty should not be undertaken without good justification. When viewed in this light, it is
a principle that all understand and that no one disputes."
Moreover, it is clear that when a form of treatment significantly
affects an individual's liberty interests, this principle attains
constitutional significance. It does not, however, demand any
discreet mode of treatment, but instead cajoles the decisionmaker to use that treatment which is least restrictive and most
appropriate under the circumstances.
When understood as the expression of a normative judgment rather than a decisionmaking imperative, the least re-'0In this regard it is fitting to recall how the Supreme Court used the doctrine in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See note 208 supra.
" But cf. Spece, supra note 63, which argues that the right to treatment
should be based on the least restrictive alternative principle.
272 See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84,
127-29 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), cert. granted,100 S.Ct. 2984
(1980); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc) (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
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strictive alternative principle is closely related to one of the
most fundamental precepts of medicine: primum non nocere.
That precept embodies the principle, integral to sound medical
practice, that no treatment be undertaken without a purpose or
without a legitimate, scientifically-based expectation that its
purpose can be achieved." The norm expressed by primum non
nocere is especially relevant to the treatment of mentally ill persons. Contemporary understanding regards normalization as the
goal of treatment for such persons. That goal can only be pursued by reducing, whenever possible, the constraints imposed
by treatment, and allowing the individual to develop his capacity
to function independently. 4 Normalization does not mean that
intrusive forms of therapy are never appropriate. It does, however, state a presumption in favor of the least restrictive and
most normalizing form of treatment. It counsels that to the extent possible those providing treatment should not unnecessarily infringe on the liberty of their patients.
Unfortunately, the treatment decisions made in our public
mental institutions are not characteristically governed by the
principle of normalization or the precept primum non nocere. It
is because the reality of those institutions is so far removed
from the norms that should govern their operation that legal
safeguards are warranted." Given the failure and the inability
of those institutions to adhere to proper standards of medical
decisionmaking, it is necessary that legal standards be adopted

11 In other words, it states a presumption against the use of intrusive forms
of therapy. See notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text.
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976); APA Position Statement, supra note 191, at
749-52; Task Panel, supra note 232, at 104-11; Roos, supra note 253, at 621-22. As
Senator Stafford has commented: "We are concerned that children with handicapping conditions be educated in the most normal possible and least restrictive setting, for how else will they adapt to the world beyond the educational environment, and how else will the nonhandicapped adapt to them? 120 CONG. REC. 15,
272 (1974). His words have considerable relevance beyond their narrowly defined

focus.
"I See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, Nos. 80-1314/15, 80-1596, Slip op. at 21-22, 28 (3d
Cir. Feb. 5, 1981); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 93
(3d Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 2984 (1980). Cf. Addington v.
Texas, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1811 (1979) (realistic limitations of psychiatric expertise
must govern commitment standards); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967) (reality
of adjudication of delinquency demands that it be done in accord with basic due
process safeguards).
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to check the abuse of intrusive forms of psychiatric treatment.
Those standards must resurrect the presumption against the
use of intrusive therapies that has not survived in the harsh institutional environment. Most importantly, procedural protections are necessary to make those standards meaningful.
Legal review of treatment decisions is necessary, but only
because of the failure of institutional officials to follow medical
norms. Hence, legal review of such decisions should be limited to
ensuring that they are in accord with the standards that should
govern them and that the decisions are legitimately arrived at.
In other words, when treatment is clearly medically appropriate
the state should be able to compel its use. Ultimately, this argument is grounded more upon a bias than upon legal theory. That
bias is that when society commits persons to mental institutions
it should use any truly beneficent powers at its disposal to treat
those persons."' Only a society unmoored from its values can
justify locking up sick people, but then not use the ability it has
to heal and cure those people. Of course, there is a snag in this
scheme: It is simply the fact that many forms of psychiatric
treatment are of questionable benefit; they often have limited
potential to cure or even significantly relieve illness, but considerable potential for harm. Thus, the key is to determine when
treatment is appropriate. When it is, society must be able to
compel its use. Many people may feel somewhat uneasy with the
disquieting images of a "brave new world" raised by the above
suggestion. Norval Morris has recently written:
Not only lack of knowledge forces us to hesitate to impose
dramatic or Draconian "cures" on criminals; basic views of the
minimum freedoms and dignities rightfully accorded human beings stay our punitive hands.... If criminals, the mentally ill,
or the retarded are subjected to coercive control beyond that
justified by the past injuries they have inflicted, then why not
you, and certainly me? We find ourselves in the business of
remaking man, and that is beyond our competence; it is an empyrean rather than an earthly task.'
What is noteworthy about this passage is not Professor Morris's rhetorical skill-not his blunt description of cures as

I" See Rodgers v. Okin, Nos. 79-1648/1649, slip op. at 16 (1st Cir. Nov. 25,
1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1981) (No. 80-1417).
See also notes 158-63 supra and accompanying text.
I Morris, supra note 30, at 1179-80.
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"Draconian" nor his more subtle attribution to physicians of
"punitive hands." The noteworthy fact is that its conclusion inevitably retracts its opening line. Despite his protestations to
the contrary, Professor Morris ultimately focuses on the core
issue-competency. His conclusions on that issue are simply too
absolute. Though there is much to the remaking of man that is
beyond our competence, there is now much that is within our
competence. Just as it is the job of mechanics to retool our cars
and the job of the legal profession to rework society, it is the job
of the medical profession to remake man.
Obviously, that job has its limits. To some extent those
limits are a function of competency. Much in the realm of
psychiatric therapy is still uncertain and unknown. Where
uncertainty reigns supreme, it will generally be inappropriate
for the state to sanction the compelled use of intrusive therapies. In such situations a more difficult path must be followed:
We must accept our limitations and live with them. The second
limit on the proper remaking of man is a matter of scope rather
than of competency. Mental illness often borders closely on
mere differences in values, beliefs, and ideas. It is important,
particularly when the coercive powers of the state are involved,
to keep psychiatric treatment in its proper place-dealing with
illness, not with social or political dissent. In this sense we must
ensure that the remaking of man does not infringe on basic
human freedoms and dignities. But there is neither dignity nor
freedom in mental illness: The acute anxiety, chronic depression,
and uncontrollable hallucinations that may characterize serious
mental illness do not deserve our protection. Society, for its own
sake and that of its wards, must be allowed to use the beneficent
powers at its disposal to control and eradicate those flaws in
human nature.
Thus, an absolute right to refuse treatment is not warranted. However, the power to compel treatment must be confined to prevent it outstepping its proper limits. The least
restrictive alternative doctrine is the appropriate means to accomodate these competing interests. The doctrine simply stands
for the principle that when the state infringes fundamental individual liberties it should do so in the least harmful manner possible. Precisely how the doctrine should be realized must, of
course, vary with the context in which it is used. Properly applied in this context, the doctrine demands that before the state
compels the use of intrusive forms of psychiatric therapy it must
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show that such treatment is clearly medically warranted. If invested with procedural safeguards that will make this standard
realistically effective, the doctrine can protect mentally ill persons from unwarranted intrusions justified in the name of treatment. The advantage of least restrictive alternative analysis is
that it imposes minimal constraints upon the treatment choices
available to the state, while at the same time it effectively
safeguards the liberties of mentally ill persons. Properly confined
by the requirements of this context, the least restrictive alternative doctrine can help lead the way to an appropriate balance.

* Ed note. Subsequent to the editing of this article, the Supreme Court
rendered its opinion in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 49 U.S.L.W.
4363 (April 21, 1981). The Court held that the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976), did not create any
substantive right of mentally retarded persons to receive treatment in the "least
restrictive environment." 49 U.S.L.W. at 4368-69. The Court remanded the matter to the Third Circuit to consider whether a right to treatment in the least
restrictive environment is provided by other statutes or by the Constitution.
Because of its disposition of the case, the Court never reached the question of the
appropriate contours of a right to least restrictive treatment.
Interestingly, on the same day, the Court granted certiorari in Rodgers v.
Okin, 49 U.S.L.W. 3779. Thus, the Court will soon consider the question whether
"committed mental patients have [a] constitutional right to refuse treatment with
antipsychotic medication." Id.
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